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"All that is lacking is a sack of stones for throwing." 1
The struggle for adequate recognition of the human rights of lesbian
and gay persons in the United States today faces an aggressively organized
opposition that has targeted, in particular, the some 139 jurisdictions in the
United States that have enacted laws to protect lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals from various forms of discrimination. 2 This organized opposition
successfully secured the adoption of Colorado Amendment Two, which not
only repealed existing state laws that protect gay people from
discrimination, but also banned all future laws that would recognize such
claims by lesbians and gay men.3 Arguments for constitutional limits on
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1 Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 659
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. SO-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal.
Mar. 12, 1992).
2 See Note, Constitutional Limits on Ani-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1905, 1905 (1993).
3 See COLO. CONST., art. H, § 30b. The full text of article II, § 30b (Amendment
Two) is as follows:
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such anti-lesbian/gay initiatives have taken a number of forms, including
Guarantee Clause objections to their antirepublican character, 4 objections
on grounds of suspect classification analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause,5 free speech and associational liberty claims under the First
Amendment, 6 and abridgments of the fundamental right of political
participation under the Equal Protection Clause.7 The last of these
arguments was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Colorado in its judgment
affirming the lower court's preliminary injunction against enforcement of
Colorado Amendment Two.8
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
Id. The voters of Colorado approved Amendment Two by a vote of 53.4% to 46.6%
on November 3, 1992. On July 19, 1993, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
grant of a preliminary injunction against the Amendment. See Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). On December 14,
1993, Judge H. Jeffrey Bayless granted a permanent injunction against the
Amendment, finding that under the strict scrutiny standard applicable to the
constitutional assessment of the Amendment in Evans, the state failed to justify the
Amendment in terms of compelling state interests. See Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 755-59 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1993).
4 See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican
Government" The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 20 (1993);
John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial
Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 188-97 (1993).
5 See Note, supra note 2, at 1912-14; Niblock, supra note 4, at 167-77.
6 See Note, supra note 2, at 1919-22.
7 See id. at 1916-18; Niblock, supra note 4, at 178-88.
8 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419
(1993). Another argument, questioning the constitutionality of these initiatives, is a
form of heightened rational basis scrutiny along the lines of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985) (striking down a zoning
law that prohibited mentally retarded individuals from residing in certain parts of
town). See also Note, supra note 2, at 1914-16. Because the force of this argument
depends on analogies to already existing suspect classes and fundamental rights, it will
be only as strong as those analogies. Accordingly, this Article will not independently
explore this argument, but assumes that the interpretive insights afforded by this
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This Article argues that the strongest constitutional argument for
constitutional limits on anti-lesbian/gay rights initiatives is the one that has
been the least explored in the available literature9 and the one that all other
arguments implicitly depend on for their force: namely, the initiatives in
question express, through public law, constitutionally forbidden sectarian
religious intolerance against the fundamental rights of conscience, speech,
and association of lesbian and gay persons protected by America's first and
premier civil liberty, the liberty of conscience. ° My argument thus
critically examines the various current arguments regarding constitutional
limits on anti-lesbian/gay rights initiatives. It then constructively suggests
the clarifying explanatory and normative power of an alternative
perspective on this issue. This perspective focuses on religious intolerance
as the first suspect classification under American constitutional law and the
principled characterization of anti-lesbian/gay rights initiatives as reflecting
this suspect classification. Indeed, my larger claim is that the suspectness
of sexual preference rests on the traditional suspectness of religious
classifications, in this case, classification based on lesbian and gay personal
and moral conscientious identity. If this is a suspect classification, then the
initiatives in question run afoul of our historically most robust and most
textually explicit constitutional guarantees of the rights of the person.
Ironically, the sectarian religious proponents of these initiatives
egregiously degrade and abuse the American constitutional traditions of
religious liberty that they claim to cherish and protect." It is time for
Americans to reclaim and reaffirm their central constitutional guarantees of
religious toleration and pluralism, the basic rights owed, on terms of
principle, to all Americans, including lesbian and gay Americans. Nothing
Article can be usefully transposed to clarify its force. For example, if these initiatives,
on analysis, express constitutionally suspect religious intolerance, that fact may clarify
the special critical force that heightened rational basis scrutiny has been supposed to
have in the case of these initiatives. For development of similar themes, see Niblock,
supra note 4.
9 For example, the Harvard Law Review Note dismisses, as "beyond the scope of
this Note," a possible Establishment Clause objection to anti-gay-rights initiatives. See
Note, supra note 2, at 1921. It is not explained why a note entitled Constitutional
Linits on And-Gay-Rights Initiatives fails to consider one of the more powerful
constitutional arguments against such initiatives.
10 See generally THOMAS I. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); WILLIAM L.
MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY. RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1987).
11 For example, a proposed anti-lesbian/gay initiative in Oregon rested its case on
"a Right of Conscience." deParrie v. Keisling, 862 P.2d 494, 495 (Or. 1993).
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less than the integrity of our constitutionalism is at stake.
I. CURRENT CONSTITuTIoNAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANTI-
LESBIAN/GAY INITIATVES
All of the important current constitutional arguments against anti-
lesbian/gay initiatives implicitly assume and sometimes expressly identify a
feature of these initiatives as central to their unconstitutional status:
namely, their roots in sectarian religious intolerance.
Hans Linde's important development of a Guarantee Clause objection
to these initiatives illustrates the latter point. 12 Linde makes a powerful
historical and textual case against the judiciary's failure to interpret the
Guarantee Clause in a manner that raises objections to initiatives in
general, and he suggests compelling reasons why such arguments should be
developed to invalidate initiative lawmaking against the rights of
homosexuals. 13 Linde quite properly underscores Madison's objections to
Athenian mass assemblies and the need for a republican alternative that
would harness democratic political power, through the delegation of such
power to representative, deliberative political bodies, in ways more likely
both to respect human rights and advance the public interest. 14 Consistent
with the Madisonian political theory of American constitutionalism, Linde
argues that initiatives must be condemned as antirepublican when they are
12 See Linde, supra note 4, at 36.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 23-24. Madison makes this point most clearly in THE FEDERALIST No.
63 in the following terms:
From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is clear that the
principle of representation was neither unknown to the ancients, nor wholly
overlooked in their political constitutions. The true distinction between these and
the American governments lies in the total exclusion of the people in their
collective capacity, from any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of
representatives of the people from the administration of the former. The
distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most
advantageous superiority in favor of the United States. But to insure to this
advantage its full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other
advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed, that any form of
representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits
occupied by the democracies of Greece.
THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison). See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison), for further development of these themes.
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functionally most equivalent to the factionalized excesses of the Athenian
mass assemblies, and thus he articulates five criteria of such functional
equivalence. 15 Four of Linde's criteria focus on the factionalized character
of such direct lawmaking and its mobilization of majoritarian factionalized
group insularity against the conscientious views of unjustly stigmatized
outsiders to dominant groups. 16 Madison, following Jefferson, regarded
liberty of conscience as the central inalienable right of free persons, 17 and
consistent with this view, Linde frames his criteria of equivalence to
identify those forms of political factionalism that most threaten the
inalienable right to conscience.' 8 However, it is an analytically striking
feature of Linde's position that, while his argument expressly assumes this
Madisonian framework, he does not focus on the substantive normative
considerations that motivate both Madison's and his own argument.
Other constitutional arguments against anti-lesbian/gay initiatives are,
if anything, less explicit about the role these substantive normative
considerations play in their view of the matter. Yet, on examination, such
considerations invariably clarify and strengthen the force such arguments
have and should be taken to have.
For example, the claim that initiatives like Colorado Amendment Two
unconstitutionally deploy a suspect classification standardly explores
judicially accepted suspect classifications like race and gender in terms of
features of these classifications (e.g., political powerlessness, salience, and
immutability) that are alleged to be analogous to sexual preference. 19 There
are important analogies of principle central to the constitutionally suspect
nature of race and gender that apply equally to sexual preference. But, for
reasons I offer below, these analogies cannot be plausibly understood in
terms of political powerlessness, salience, or immutability because none of
these features plausibly explain the suspectness of race and gender let alone
sexual preference. Emphasis on these analogies not only fails to do justice
to the suspectness of race and gender, but it renders problematic the
suspectness of sexual preference for reasons (e.g., controversies over its
salience and immutability) that should be and are irrelevant. 20 We need an
15 See Linde, supra note 4, at 41-43.
16 See id. at 41-42.
17 For fuller discussion, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITuTIONALIsM 173-82 (1989) [hereinafter RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS]; DAVID
A.l. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 111-16 (1986) [hereinafter
RICHARDS, TOLERATION].
18 Linde, supra note 4, at 41-43.
19 See Note, supra note 2, at 1912-14.
20 For various judicial opinions that have foundered on such false analogies (i.e.,
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approach to suspect classification analysis not burdened by these false and
misleading analogies. The case for the suspectness of sexual preference is
stronger than any case yet made on these grounds. We need an approach
that can make this case. For that approach, we must look, as I shall later
suggest, to the roots of suspect classification analysis in the suspectness of
religious classifications.
The argument that anti-lesbian/gay initiatives abridge central free
speech rights of homosexuals builds on the important role that traditional
guarantees of free speech have played in the protection of speech associated
with the development and expression of lesbian and gay public identity in
American political and constitutional culture.21 In particular, the initiatives
are condemned as violations of free speech because the initiatives'
constitutional repeal and prohibition of laws forbidding discrimination on
grounds of sexual preference intimidate lesbian and gay persons not to
assert their rights of free speech to affirm their homosexuality as a public
identity. The argument has, as an argument of free speech, limited force
applicable to the censorship of speech as such, an argument that some may
find strained on the facts. (Colorado Amendment Two, on this view, leaves
the regime of free speech quite intact, robustly deployed publicly, as this
Article itself shows, in a number of weighty constitutional criticisms of the
Amendment.) Its argumentative force would be much more powerfully
targeted on Amendment Two if it were not limited to censorship of speech,
but included constitutionally suspect religious censorship of the right of
conscience itself-in effect, degrading one form of conscientious conviction
as less worthy of equal respect than others. Perhaps, as I believe, that is
what advocates of this argument implicitly assume. If so, the force of their
denying the suspectness of sexual orientation on such grounds), see High Tech Gays v.
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-74 (9th Cir. 1990);
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-66 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom.
Ben-Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
1068, 1075-76 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 101-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987). For an example of a judicial opinion
that analytically rebutted these false analogies in a principled, analytically rigorous
way and found sexual preference to be a suspect classification, see Watkins v. United
States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990).
21 See Note, supra note 2, at 1919-22. For the important role of arguments of
free speech in the struggle for the rights of lesbian and gay persons, see NAN D.
HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 1-14 (2d ed. 1992); Jose
GJomez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 L.




argument would be both clarified and deepened, as a matter of
constitutional principle, if it were explicitly connected (as it usually is not)
with the roots of the guarantee of free speech in the freedom of
conscience. 22 If the argument could be reconceived in this way, it would
have force not only in its application to speech as conventionally
understood, but also to the issues of freedom of conscience that are, in
fact, the central normative considerations at issue. We need a way of
thinking about these questions that can clarify these connections and thus
strengthen our constitutional arguments.
Finally, the argument that anti-lesbian/gay initiatives abridge
fundamental rights of political participation23 rests on an interpretive
generalization from Supreme Court decisions invalidating attempts to
restructure politics in ways hostile to racial minorities.24 The principle of
these cases is not, on this view, the suspectness of race, but a more general
principle that constitutional rights of political participation are abridged
when politics is restructured (e.g., by initiatives leading to state
constitutional amendments) in ways hostile to any identifiable class. These
cases include not only constitutionally recognized suspect classes like racial
minorities, but also other groups (like homosexuals) who are not, or at
least not yet, a constitutionally recognized suspect class.2 The argument
rests on an extrapolation from existing case law that might have force if
supported by convincing arguments of democratic political theory
regarding the general terms of fair representation: in particular, that such
representation forbids all constitutional arrangements that are detrimental to
2 2 For extended argument to this effect, see RicHARDs, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
17, at 172-201; RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 165-87.
23 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285-86 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 419 (1993); Note, supra note 2, at 1916-18.
24 See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating
state initiative depriving local school districts of power, absent a judicial order, to
eliminate racial imbalance through mandatory busing); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969) (invalidating city charter amendment that repealed existing local
antidiscrimination ordinances and that required future voter approval of any city
ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that a facially neutral amendment
to the California state constitution, which would have prevented the state from
interfering with a person's "absolute" right to sell or rent property to whomever she
wanted, constituted constitutionally forbidden discriminatory state action). But cf.
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (sustaining California constitutional
amendment prohibiting court-ordered busing to alleviate de facto segregation).
25 QC. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1978).
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any political group. There are, however, no such remotely plausible
arguments as a matter of political and constitutional theory. Some political
group will be hurt by any constitutional change, a fact which is irrelevant
to the normative merits of the change, which turn rather on whether the
change, consistent with the political theory of American constitutionalism,
either better protects basic rights or channels political power to pursuit of
the public interest. 26 The argument based on the right of political
participation has greater force when it is interpreted, as it has been by both
those who have advocated and accepted it, against the background of the
rights placed at threat by Colorado Amendment Two.
In general, the argument based on the right of political participation
has force when rooted in some deprivation of basic rights, including rights
against unjust discrimination. One of the leading cases, which is the basis
of the argument for a right of political participation, makes this point quite
clear. In Hunter v. Erickson,27 an Akron charter amendment passed by
voters required that antidiscrimination housing ordinances related to race,
religion, or ancestry receive majority voter approval prior to enactment,
while other ordinances remained subject to the original rule which required
only City Council approval. 28 While Akron could decide to require all of
its municipal legislation to be approved by plebiscite, the Court held that it
could not selectively burden legislation directed against discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, or ancestry. 29 The Court acknowledged that
"the section draws no distinctions among racial and religious groups," and
that "Negroes and whites, Jews and Catholics are all subject to the same
requirements if there is housing discrimination against them which they
wish to end." 30 Nevertheless, it found the legislation had a discriminatory
impact: "[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and
gentile in an identical matter, the reality is that the law's impact falls on
the minority. The majority needs no protection against discrimination and
if it did, a referendum might be bothersome but no more than that. "31
The interpretation of this doctrine has its real constitutional force not in
establishing a general right of all groups as such, but rights of groups more
26 On the political theory of American constitutionalism, see DAvID A.J.
RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (1993) [hereinafter RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE];
RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 5, 114-48.
27 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
28 Id. at 386.
29 Id. at 393.
30 Id. at 390.
31 Id. at 391.
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narrowly construed on facts analogous to Colorado Amendment Two: in
particular, the roots of such constitutional lawmaking in forms of
constitutionally invidious intolerance. Indeed, religious discrimination
against one particular group would, under a principled interpretation of
Hunter, be the rankest form of unconstitutional expression of religious
intolerance. It would be as if the Hunter initiative did not apply,
nondiscriminatorily, to all religious discrimination, but just to religious
discrimination against, for example, Jews (an analogy I explore at some
length below). The constitutional outrage of Colorado Amendment Two is
of this magnitude. An argument is needed to show the outrageousness of
the Amendment.
Additionally, an inquiry is needed as to why lesbian and gay advocates
have failed to explicitly make an argument that they both clearly believe
and must assume as the background for the plausible interpretation of the
arguments they do make. Finally, an exploration is required of the
constitutional stakes of justice to lesbian and gay persons and of the role of
lesbian and gay advocacy in the interpretive integrity of our
constitutionalism that rests on arguments of principle that give full and fair
expression to the claim of all Americans to protection of their universal
human rights. 32
II. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Current constitutional arguments attacking anti-lesbian/gay initiatives
are less powerful than they can and should be. They cast arguments in
terms that fail to deploy powerful constitutional arguments that clarify and
strengthen their claims. We need, now, to investigate what these arguments
are.
I begin by further exploring my earlier remarks concerning difficulties
in current arguments about the suspectness of sexual preference, and then
offer my alternative view. We should, I believe, resist various attempts to
ground the suspectness of sexual preference on either political
powerlessness or the alleged immutability of sexual preference, on analogy
to race and gender, and focus rather on the suspectness of the attempt to
discriminate against the public claims to justice central to lesbian and gay
public and private identity, on analogy to religion.
3 2 For development of this point, see RIcHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at
131-71.
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A. Political Powerlessness
A plausible general theory of suspect classification analysis must unify,
on grounds of principle, the claims to such analysis of African-Americans,
women, and lesbians and gays. Political powerlessness alone cannot do so.
Lack of political power-measured either by some statistical norm such as
Ackerman's 33 or by Ely's principle of fair representation 34-does not
capture the plane of rights-based ethical discourse fundamental to suspect
classification analysis as it has been developed in authoritative case law.
An analysis based solely on political powerlessness wrongly suggests that
the gains in political solidarity of groups subjected to deep racial, sexist, or
religious prejudice (in virtue of resistance to such prejudice) disentitle them
from constitutional protection, 35 as if the often meager political gains of
blacks, women, and lesbians and gays (when measured against their claims
of justice) are the measure of constitutional justice.36 This analysis
preposterously denies constitutional protection to women because they are
a statistical majority of voters. 37 This approach also proves too much: it
extends protection to any political group, though subject to no history of
rights-denying prejudice, solely because it has not been as politically
successful as it might have been (e.g., dentists). 38 Procedural models of
33 See Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713
(1985).
3 4 See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW
(1980).
35 Ackerman likewise makes this erroneous suggestion. Ackerman, supra note 33,
at 718, 740-46.
36 Racial classifications, for example, remain as suspect as they have ever been
irrespective of the political advances of African-Americans. See, e.g., Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (awarding custody of child on grounds of race of
adoptive father held unconstitutional).
3 7 The Supreme Court has expressly regarded gender as a suspect classification
irrespective of the status of women as a political majority. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204
(1976) (holding that gender classification is not substantially related to traffic laws).
But cf. ELY, supra note 34, at 164-70 (asserting that women should be denied
constitutional protection because they constitute a majority of voters and are
noninsular).
38 The Supreme Court has declined to regard the mere fact of the greater political
success of one interest group over another as relevant to according closer scrutiny to
legislation favorable to one group over another. See, e.g., United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-76 (1980); cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1965).
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suspect classification analysis suppress the underlying substantive rights-
based normative judgments central to how equal protection should be and
has been interpreted. Such models neither explanatorily fit the case law nor
afford a sound normative model with which to criticize the case law.
Suspect classification analysis focuses on the political expression of
irrational prejudices of a certain sort: namely, those rooted in a history and
culture of unjust exclusion of a certain group from participation in the
political community required by their basic rights of conscience, speech,
and association. The fundamental wrong of racism and sexism has been the
intolerant exclusion of blacks and women from the rights of public culture,
exiling them to cultural marginality in supposedly morally inferior realms
and unjustly stigmatizing identity on such grounds. Such unjust cultural
marginalization and stigmatization also victimize homosexuals, and its
rectification entitles sexual preference to be recognized as a suspect
classification. 39 Indeed, the grounds for the suspectness of sexual
preference forthrightly rest on the oldest suspect classification under
American public law, religion.
B. Immutability
The fact that sexual preference is not, like race or gender, an
immutable and salient personal characteristic has sometimes been taken to
disqualify sexual preference from treatment as a suspect classification. 40
The argument is controversial even on its own empirical and ethical terms.
Sexual preference may be a largely settled and irreversible erotic
preference for most people long before the age of responsibility.41 The
39 1 explore the analogies between racism, sexism, and homophobia at greater
length in RICHARDS, CoNscmNcE, supra note 26, in the context of a general
interpretive study of the enduring moral legacy of the Reconstruction Amendments to
American constitutionalism-a legacy, in my judgment, properly claimed today as a
matter of principle by lesbian and gay persons. This Article further develops, refines,
and elaborates themes from this work.
40 See, e.g., Michael I. Perry, Modern Equal Protection. A Conceptualization
and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1023, 1066-67 (1979).
41 On irreversibility, see WANWRGHT CHURCHiLL, HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR
AMONG MALES 283-91 (1967); MICHAEL RUSE, HOMOSEXUALrrY 59-62 (1988). On
the early age of its formation, see JOHN MONEY & ANKE A. EHRHARDT, MAN &
WOMAN, BoY & GIRL 153-201 (1972); C.A. Tmpp, THE HOMOSEXUAL MATRIX 251
(1975); DONALD J. WEST, HOMOSEXUALrrY 266 (1986). One study hypothesizes that
gender identity and sexual object choice coincide with the development of language,
between the age of 18 to 24 months. John Money et al., An Examination of Some
Basic Sexual Concepts: The Evidence of Human Hermaphroditism, 97 BULL. JOHNS
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possible concealment or even repression of the preference-as a reason for
disqualifying it from treatment as a suspect classification-is not a
reasonable condition of political respect if sexual preference is integral to
the authenticity of moral personality and the prejudice against it is as
politically unreasonable as racism and sexism. In fact, as is more fully
argued below, sexual preference is central to self-authenticating claims to
lesbian and gay personal and ethical identity, and the prejudice against such
claims is politically unreasonable in the same way racism and sexism are
unreasonable. The sacrifice of moral authenticity is not a demand any
person could reasonably be asked to accept as the price for freedom from
irrational prejudice; and homosexual persons can no more be reasonably
asked to make such a crippling sacrifice of self than any other person.
In fact, immutability and salience do not coherently explain even the
historical paradigm of suspect classification of race, and therefore cannot
normatively define the terms of principle reasonably applicable to other
claims to suspect classification analysis. The principle of Brown v. Board
of Education42 itself cannot reasonably be understood in terms of the
abstract ethical ideal that state benefits and burdens should never turn on an
immutable and salient characteristic as such. Many examples show that this
proposition is not a reasonable ideal or principle.43 Disabled persons are
born with disabilities that often cannot be changed; nonetheless, people
with such disabilities are certainly owed, on grounds of justice, a
distinctive measure of concern aimed to accord them some fair
approximation of the opportunities of nondisabled persons. It is no moral
objection to such measures that they turn on immutable characteristics
because the larger theory of distributive justice has identified such factors
as reasonably relevant to its concerns.
The example is not an isolated one; its principle pervades the justice of
rewards and of fair distribution more generally. For example, we reward
certain athletic achievements very highly and do not finely calibrate the
components of our rewards attributable to acts of self-disciplined will from
those based on natural endowments. Achievement itself suffices to elicit
reward even though some significant part of it turns on immutable physical
endowments that some have and others lack. Or, we allocate scarce places
in institutions of higher learning on the basis of an immutable factor such
as geographic distribution, an educational policy we properly regard as
HOPKINs Hosp. 301, 308-10 (1955); cf. ALAN P. BELL ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCE
(1978). For a recent judicious review of the relevant scientific literature, see RICHARD
GREEN, SEXUAL SCIENCE AND THE LAW 62-86 (1992).
42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 For a similar analysis, see RONALD DwoRKxN, LAW'S EMPIRE 381-99 (1986).
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sensible and not unfair. The point can be reasonably generalized to
conclude that part of the theory of distributive justice is concerned with
both maintaining an economic and social minimum and some structure of
differential rewards to elicit better performance for the public good. The
idea of a just minimum turns on certain facts about levels of subsistence,
not on acts of will; we would not regard such a minimum as any the less
justly due if some component of it turned on immutable factors.
Differential rewards perform the role of incentives for the kind of
performance required by modem industrial market economies such as the
economies of the United States and Western Europe; immutable factors
such as genetic endowment may play some significant role in such
performance. Nonetheless, we do not regard it as unjust to reward such
performance so long as the incentives work out with the consequences
specified by our theory of distributive justice. Our conclusion, from a wide
range of diverse examples, must be that immutability and salience do not
identify an ethically reasonable principle of suspect classification analysis.
Race is a suspect classification, not on these grounds, but when it
expresses a rights-denying culture of irrational political prejudice. Persons
are not regarded as victimized by this prejudice because they are physically
unable to change or to mask the trait defining the class, but because the
prejudice itself assigns intrinsically unreasonable weight to and burdens on
identifications central to moral personality. Race in America is culturally
defined by the "one-drop" rule under which quite small proportions of
black genes suffice to be regarded as black, including persons who are for
all visibly salient purposes nonblack. 44 Persons who are black by this
definition could pass as white; most, including some historically important
African-American leaders, choose not to do so.45 Choosing to pass as
white would cut them off from intimately personal relationships to family
and community that nurture and sustain self-respect and personal
integrity;46 the price of avoiding racial prejudice is an unreasonable
sacrifice of basic resources of personal and ethical identity that they will
not accept. In effect, one is to avoid injustice by a denial of one's moral
powers to protest injustice, degrading moral integrity into silent complicity
with evil. The same terms of cultural degradation apply to all victims of
racism whether visibly or nonvisibly black, the demand of supine
acceptance of an identity unjustly devalued.
Racial prejudice is an invidious political evil precisely because it is
44 See generally F. JAMEs DAvIs, WHO Is BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION
(1991).
45 Id. at 7, 56-57, 77-78, 178-79.
46 Id. at 56-57.
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directed against central aspects of a person's cultural and moral identity on
irrationalist grounds of subjugation in virtue of that identity. The central
point is not that its irrationalist object is some brute fact that cannot be
changed, but that it is based on a central feature of moral personality: in
particular, "the way people think, feel, and believe, not how they look"-
the identifications that make them "members of the black ethnic
community." 47 Racial prejudice, thus analyzed, shares common features
with certain forms of religious intolerance. In particular, racism and anti-
Semitism share a common irrationalist fear: invisible blackness or the
secret Jew, persons who can pass as white or Christian but who are
allegedly tainted by some fundamental incapacity to fully identify
themselves as authentically a member of the majoritarian race or religion. 48
Such incapacity is ascribed to persons on the basis of "perceived attitudes
and social participation rather than on ... appearance or lineage." 49 In
effect, any dissent from the dominant racist or anti-Semitic orthodoxy, let
alone sympathetic association with the stigmatized minority, is interpreted
as evidence of being a member of the defective minority, thus imposing a
reign of intellectual terror on any morally independent criticism of racial or
religious intolerance and encouraging a stigmatized minority to accept the
legitimacy of subordination. 50 The structural resemblance of racism to a
form of religious intolerance is an important feature of its American
historical background and is fundamental to a sound interpretation of the
suspectness of race under American constitutional law.
The interpretive status of race, as the paradigm interpretive case of a
suspect classification under the American constitutional law of the Equal
Protection Clause, arose against the background of the interdependent
institutions of American slavery and racism and the persistence of racism,
supported by its constitutional legitimation in cases like Plessy v.
Ferguson,51 long after the formal abolition of slavery. Racist institutions,
like race-based slavery and its legacy of American apartheid, 52 importantly
evolved from an unjust and constitutionally illegitimate religious
intolerance against African-Americans held in slavery. Racist prejudice was
47 Id. at 179.48 Id. at 55-56, 145.
49 Id. at 145.
50 For exploration of anti-Semitism, see MICHAEL LERNER, THE SOCIALISM OF
FooLs: ANTI-SEMrrISM ON THE LEFr (1992).
51 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
52 For a recent important study of the persistence of this injustice, see DOUGLAs
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAXING O THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
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thus, in its origins, an instance of religious discrimination. This
discrimination later developed, in ideological support of the institution of
American slavery, into a systematically unjust cultural intolerance of
African-Americans as an ethnic group, reflected in their degradation from
the status of bearers of human rights such as the basic rights of conscience,
speech, intimate association, and work.5 3 Race is constitutionally suspect
when and to the extent public law expresses such unjust racial prejudice,
reflecting the unjust cultural degradation of a class of persons from their
status as bearers of basic human rights.5 4 The evil of such prejudice is its
systematic degradation of identifications central to free moral personality,
including powers to protest injustice in the name and voice of one's human
rights.
The suspectness of gender,55 ethnicity,5 6 alienage,57 or illegitimacy 58
also cannot be plausibly understood in terms of some physical
immutability. People not only can have operations to change their sex, but
can and have successfully passed as members of the opposite gender. 59
Latinos can pass as Anglos, aliens can become citizens, and the status of
illegitimate children can be changed. The suspectness of the underlying
prejudice in each case is its irrationalist interpretation of central aspects of
human personality and the unjust degradation of the culture with which a
person reasonably identifies. 60
From this perspective, the issue of the immutability of sexual
preference should be irrelevant to its constitutional examination as a
suspect classification, and the issue of irrational political prejudice, which
53 1 develop this argument at greater length in RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra
note 26, at 80-89, 150-70.
5 4 For further development of this argument, see id. at 170-77.
55 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
56 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-79 (1954).
5 7 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
58 See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
5 9 See, e.g., LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GILs AND TWILIGHT LOvERS: A HISTORY
OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 42-43 (1991) [hereinafter
FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS]; LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOvE OF MEN:
ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LovE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE
PRESENT 292 (1981) [hereinafter FADERMAN, SURPASSING].
60 The suspectness of gender, in particular, reflects a history of unjust
degradation and resulting irrationalist prejudice, which account for when and why
gender is constitutionally suspect. For further development of this argument, see
RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 178-91.
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does not turn on salience, should be central to the analysis. In particular, a
central theme of this examination should be the unreasonable weight and
burden such prejudice places on cultural identifications central to moral
personality. The insistence on immutability and salience as requirements
for suspect classification analysis in the case -of sexual preference is
unprincipled. It is not a requirement we impose elsewhere, and there is no
good argument of principle why we should impose it here.61
It is particularly paradoxical to hold only sexual preference to these
requirements when the underlying irrationalist prejudice, homophobia,
transparently expresses the very origins of suspect classification analysis in
the first suspect classification under American public law, religion. Such
religious intolerance in its nature is directed at a disfavored religious or,
more broadly, conscientiously-based dissenting identity, both placing
burdens on conscientious exercise of religion and putting pressure on
dissenting conscience to change identity in line with majoritarian
orthodoxy. Such intolerance focuses, more transparently than racism or
sexism, on the malleabilities of conscientious identity and thus can even
less plausibly be regarded as rooted in immutable physical facts. This
illustrates the paradoxicality of holding religiously-based intolerance of
sexual preference to this requirement. If political homophobia is, on
examination, a constitutionally illegitimate expression of religious
intolerance, public laws reflecting this prejudice should be forthrightly
constitutionally suspect on the clearest textual and historical constitutional
grounds: the central American constitutional tradition of religious
toleration under the religion clauses of the First Amendment that suspect
classification analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment assumes and elaborates, and certainly does not repeal or
retrench.
Against this background, there are good reasons why lesbian and gay
persons might and should resist interpreting their claims to suspect
classification analysis in the biological and genetic terms that some gay
scientists have recently proposed. 62 To claim a mode of argument not
61 Cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990) (considering immutability as a factor in equal protection
analysis); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Honosexuality as a
Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1302-03 (1985).
62 For further developments of this skeptical theme, see Janet E. Halley, Sexual
Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability,
46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994); Edward Stein, The Relevance of Scientific Research




required for other claimants to suspect classification analysis ethically
undercuts the integrity of the arguments of principle that lesbians and gays
may, can, and should make as arguments available on fair terms to all
persons. It also falsely and malignantly reduces to biological terms what is
essentially a principled argument for the just and ethical emancipation of
the moral powers of conscience of lesbian and gay persons in terms that
subvert its emancipatory potential. Biological reductionism was central to
the unjust cultural subjugation of African-Americans and women as a
separate species, 63 and will wreak comparable havoc on lesbians and gay
men today by confirming, rather than challenging, the unjust cultural
stereotypes of an inferiority rooted in nature (in this case, biology). The
repetition of the terms of our subjugation is not needed, but an empowering
critical perspective on the cultural terms of our degradation and on our
corresponding political, ethical, and intellectual responsibilities to exercise
our active moral powers of criticism and reconstruction of that culture on
terms of justice is required. 64 Lesbians and gays need responsibly to insist
on and to demand our personal and moral identity as lesbian and gay
persons, and to resist those unjust and objectifying stereotypes that have
stripped us of our powers of free moral personality.
The contemporary constitutional issue of principle precisely highlights
the devastating impact on the basic rights of lesbian and gay people of a
heretofore unchallenged hegemonic, homophobic religio-cultural
orthodoxy. This orthodoxy has stunted and stultified the range of human
and moral intelligence and imagination-the basic resources of
conscience-that lesbian and gay persons, as individuals, may reasonably
bring to the diverse patterns of a well-lived and ethical life. This orthodoxy
also today self-consciously and aggressively wars against the ethical
empowerment of lesbian and gay persons to protest its injustice. We need
an interpretation of suspect classification analysis adequate to our
indignation at the force this unjust culture has uncritically enjoyed and
plainly continues to enjoy. The clear constitutional objection to unjust
religious persecution is, I believe, the ground for our indignation.
63 See STEPHEN I. GOULD, THE MiSMEAsURE oFMAN (1981); CAROL TAvRis, THE
MisMEAsuRE op WoMAN (1992).
64 For exploration of this issue from the perspective of the responsibilities of the
American law school, see David A.J. Richards, Liberal Political Culture and the
Marginalized Voice: Interpretive Responsibility and the American Law School, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1955 (1993).
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C. Sexual Preference as a Suspect Religious Classification
The most illuminating constitutional analogy for the suspectness of
sexual preference today is neither race nor gender, but the oldest suspect
classification under American public law, religion.65 The constitutional
protection of religion never turned on its putative immutable and salient
character (people can and do convert, and can and do conceal their
religious convictions), but on the traditional place of religion in the
conscientious and reasonable formation of one's moral identity in public
and private life and the need for protection, consistent with respect for the
inalienable right of conscience, of persons against state impositions of
sectarian religious views. In particular, the identifications central to one's
self-respect as a person of conscience are not to be subject to sectarian
impositions through public law that unreasonably burden the exercise of
one's conscientious convictions (the free exercise principle)66 or encourage
change of such convictions to sectarian orthodoxy (the antiestablishment
principle). 67 Normative claims by lesbian and gay persons today have
exactly the same ethical and constitutional force: they are in their nature
claims to a self-respecting personal and moral identity in public and private
life through which they may reasonably express and realize their ethical
convictions of the moral powers of love and friendship in a good, fulfilled,
and responsible life against the background of an unjust and now quite
conspicuously sectarian tradition of moral subjugation.68 Correspondingly,
the political reaction to such claims, as reflected in Colorado Amendment
Two, is precisely based on sectarian religious objection to the
conscientious claims of justice made by and on behalf of lesbian and gay
identity as a form of conscience that is entitled to equal respect under
fundamental American guarantees of freedom of conscience. At bottom, the
point is that the very fact of lesbian and gay identity, precisely in virtue of
its conscientious claims to justice, is as unworthy of respect as a
traditionally despised religion like Judaism; the practice of that form of
conscience may thus be abridged, and certainly persons may be encouraged
65 See RicHARDs, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 260, 280.
66 For fuller discussion, see RiCHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 140--46.
67 Id. at 146-62.
68 1 develop this theme of moral subjugation as a form of moral slavery (relevant
to claims of African-Americans, women, and lesbians and gays) in David A.J.
Richards, Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent, 9 CHL.-KENT L. REv. 787 (1994).
For a related argument similar to the one I offer here, see Janet E. Halley, The
Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rav. 915 (1989).
[Vol. 55:491
SEXUAL PREFERENCE
to convert from its demands or, at least, be supinely and ashamedly silent.
This is the very pith and substance of constitutionally illegitimate religious
intolerance which has no proper place under the letter and spirit of
American constitutionalism. Sexual preference should be a suspect
classification on the most traditional and conservative readings of American
constitutional principles: namely, on the ground that it has been and is the
object of unjust sectarian religious intolerance against the essential and
inalienable human right of conscience. Lesbian and gay persons have as
much right to make claims on the basis of such principles as any persons
and citizens in America. It is time that they reclaimed America's traditions
of toleration from the bigoted, religious sectarians of the right who have so
degraded and abused them.
The essential points of the suspect classification analysis of sexual
preference are: (1) a history and culture of unjust moral subjugation of
homosexuals, (2) the political legitimization of such subjugation by the
exclusion of homosexuals from the constitutional community of equal
rights in the unreasonable way that gives rise to intolerance and the
irrational political prejudice of homophobia, and (3) the sectarian religious
expression of such prejudice against the conscientious claims of lesbian and
gay persons to justice in public and private life.
The history and culture of the moral subjugation of homosexuals are
ancient. In The Laws, Plato gave influential expression to the moral
condemnation in terms of two arguments: its nonprocreative character,
and, in its male homosexual forms, its degradation of the passive male
partner to the status of a woman.69 Homosexuality was, on this view, an
immoral and unnatural abuse of the proper human function of sexuality,
marking the homosexual as subhuman and therefore wholly outside the
moral community of persons.70 The exile of homosexuals from any just
claim on moral community was given expression by the striking moral idea
of homosexuality as unspeakable. It was, in Blackstone's terms, "a crime
not fit to be named; peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non
nominandum"71-not mentionable, let alone discussed or assessed. Such
total silencing of any reasonable discussion rendered homosexuality into a
69 See 8 PLATO, LAWS *835d-42a. On the moral condemnation of the passive
role in homosexuality in both Greek and early Christian moral thought, see PETER
BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RENUNCIATION IN EARLY
CHRISTIANITY30, 382-83 (1988).
70 Consistent with this view, Kant thus claims that homosexuality dishonors
humanity and degrades the individual "below the level of the animals ....
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 170 (Louis Infield trans., 1979) (1930).
714 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215.
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kind of cultural death, naturally thus understood and indeed condemned as
a kind of ultimate heresy against essential moral values. 72
The traditional moral condemnation of homosexuality was, in its
historical nature, a form of intolerance that should have been subject to
appropriate political and constitutional assessment in light of the argument
for toleration.73 However, liberal political theory, as in the related area of
gender,74 not only failed reasonably to extend its analysis to sexual
preference, it indulged irrationalist intolerance by accepting an
unreasonable conception of constitutional community which excludes
homosexuals as subhuman and unworthy of the rights of conscience, free
speech, and association central to the exercise of their moral powers. 75 The
same defective political epistemology of gender and sexuality that
unleashed the longstanding cultural intolerance against women76 applied, a
fortiori, to homosexuals, a group whose sexuality was, because morally
unspeakable, even less well understood, fairly discussed, or empirically
assessed. The vacuum of fair discussion and assessment was filled by the
fears and irrationalist stereotypes reflective of the long moral tradition that
exiled homosexuals from moral community.
It is consistent with this argument about homophobia as a culturally
constructed irrational prejudice-an insult to culture-creating rights-to
observe the extraordinarily important role homosexuals have played in the
construction of Western culture, including its arts. 77 An argument of
essential human rights is not directed at saints, heroes, or persons of
genius, who can find creative redemption in circumstances that crush the
moral powers of other people. The cultural tradition of the West may
honor its women and men of genius who are homosexuals, but not as
homosexuals and not homosexuals as such. The bitter, plain truth is that
ordinary people of good will, whose sexual preference was homosexual,
could find in their culture only their denial as unspeakable, voiceless, dead.
72 For further discussion of this point, see RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note
17, at 278-79. For a useful historical overview on the social construction of
homosexuality, see DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY
(1988).
73 For further elaboration of this argument and its implications for American
constitutional law, see RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26; RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIoNS, supra note 17; RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17.
74 For fuller development of this point, see RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note
26, at 178-91.
75 For relevant historical background, see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL
CRITICISM OF LAW 78-82 (1977).
76 For fuller elaboration, see RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 178-91.
77 See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY (Wayne R. Dynes ed., 1990).
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The persisting political force of irrationalist homophobia, as an
independent political evil, is quite apparent today when persons feel free to
indulge their prejudices against homosexuals, as reflected in Colorado
Amendment Two, although neither of the two traditional moral reasons for
condemning homosexuality can any longer be legitimately and indeed
constitutionally imposed on society at large.
One such moral reason-the condemnation of nonprocreational sex-
can no longer constitutionally justify, for example, laws against the sale to
and use of contraceptives by married and unmarried heterosexual
couples. 78 The mandatory enforcement at large of the procreational model
of sexuality is, in circumstances of overpopulation and declining infant and
adult mortality, a sectarian religious ideal lacking adequate secular basis in
the general goods that can alone reasonably justify state power.
Accordingly, contraceptive-using heterosexuals have the constitutional
right to decide when and whether their sexual lives shall be pursued to
procreate or as an independent expression of mutual love, affection, and
companionship. 79
The other moral reason for condemning homosexual sex-the
degradation of a man to the passive status of a woman-rests on the sexist
premise of the degraded nature of women. That premise has been properly
rejected as a reasonable basis for laws or policies on grounds of suspect
classification analysis.80
Nonetheless, although each moral ground for the condemnation of
homosexuality has been independently rejected as a reasonable justification
for coercive laws enforceable on society at large, they unreasonably retain
their force when brought into specific relationship to the claims of
homosexuals for equal justice under constitutional law. It is precisely such
claims that are distorted by sectarian viewpoints into claims for special
rights81 and are indeed aggressively attacked on such sectarian grounds, as
78 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
79 For further discussion, see RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 256-61.
80 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
81 The rhetoric of "special rights" has been conspicuously used in support of anti-
lesbian/gay intitiatives and referenda, blatantly mischaracterizing a principled claim of
persons to be free of invidious discrimination that is no more a claim to special
consideration than any other claim (for example, by African-Americans and women)
to be protected from such discrimination. The distorting characterization has been
noted by several courts in refusing to allow proposed lawmaking to include such a
description of antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Faipeas v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Alaska 1993) (holding referendum petition to repeal
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I more fully show below, thus unconstitutionally expressing sectarian
religious intolerance through public law.
These claims are today, in their basic nature, arguments of principle
made by homosexuals for the same respect for their intimate love life, free
of unreasonable procreational and sexist requirements, that is now rather
generously accorded heterosexual couples. Empirical issues relating to
sexuality and gender are now subjected to more impartial critical
assessment than they were previously, and the resulting light of public
reason about issues of sexuality and gender should be available to all
persons on fair terms. However, such a claim for fair treatment, an
argument of basic constitutional principle if any argument is, was
contemptuously dismissed by a majority of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Bowers v. Hardwick.82
Traditional moral arguments, now clearly reasonably rejected in their
application to heterosexuals, were uncritically applied to a group much
more exigently in need of constitutional protection on grounds of
principle.8 3 Reasonable advances in the public understanding of sexuality
and gender, now constitutionally available to all heterosexuals, were
suspended in favor of an appeal to the sexual mythology of the Middle
Ages.84 The transparently unprincipled character of Bowers confirms the
unjust continuing complicity of American constitutionalism with the
legitimation of the cultural construction of the morally subjugated status of
"special homosexual ordinance" does not fairly characterize ordinance which it
proposes to repeal); Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr.
2d 648, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, No. S0-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS
1251 (Cal. Mar. 12, 1992) (holding proposed initiative, including notice of intent to
circulate petition that described antidiscrimination legislation as conferring special
rights, to be fraud on electorate); cf Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Or.
1993) (modifying initiative to strike reference to removing homosexuality as minority
status subject to special classifications).
82 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
83 For further criticism, see RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 209-47.
84 Justice Blackmun put the point acidly:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "lilt is revolting to have Po better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long
since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
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homosexuals. If the Plessy 85 court illegitimately fostered the construction
of American racism, the Bowers court has illegitimately advanced the
construction of homophobia.
The issue in Bowers, the illegitimate criminalization of homosexual sex
acts, is not the same issue as suspect classification analysis. Not all acts
that should enjoy protection by the constitutional right to privacy would
also call for suspect classification analysis; contraceptive-using
heterosexual adults, who enjoy and should enjoy protection by the
constitutional right to privacy, are not reasonably understood as a suspect
class. And the scope of protection of groups properly regarded as suspect
classes cannot be limited to the right to privacy or indeed to any
fundamental right; protection extends to all laws or policies actuated by
irrational prejudice. Correspondingly, the issue of sexual preference, as a
suspect classification, is much larger than the issue of Bowers. Bowers is
an interpretive mistake as an analysis of the constitutional right to
privacy.8 6 But even if Bowers had been rightly decided as a matter of
permissible criminalization, it is settled law that a logical and normative
space exists for making and indeed sustaining independent equal protection
arguments. Neither the Supreme Court's opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird,87
extending the right to contraceptives beyond married couples, nor Carey v.
Population Services International,88 further extending the right to minors,
requires the premise that the state could not criminalize the sex acts in
question. Even if the state could properly criminalize unmarried or
underage sex, the distinctions drawn in Eisenstadt, between married and
unmarried, and in Carey, between adult and minor, could and would
properly be struck down as unreasonable as a matter of equal protection
law in relation to contraception. 89 Equal protection and privacy analysis
85 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
86 1 develop this argument at greater length in RIcHARDS, FOuNDATIONs, supra
note 17, at 202-47, and in David A.I Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and
Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800 (1986). See also Anne B. Goldstein,
Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on Janet Halley's "Reasoning About
Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick", 79 VA. L. REV. 1781
(1993); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching
for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988); Janet
E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721 (1993); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531 (1992); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A
Rhetorical Reading ofBowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1805 (1993).
87 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
89 Accord Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding unconstitutional
19941
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
overlap, but are not coextensive. In particular, the suspectness of sexual
preference under the Equal Protection Clause rests on independent
grounds. 90
The moral insult of homophobia, like that of racism and sexism, cannot
be limited to any particular right, but to the denigration of one's status as a
bearer of rights within the moral community of equal rights, in particular,
conscientious personal and moral identity as a lesbian or gay person.
Suspect classification analysis arose from the study of the radical political
evil of a political culture, ostensibly committed to toleration on the basis of
universal human rights, that unjustly denied a class of persons the cultural
space in the political community that is their inalienable human right as
persons with moral powers. Liberal political culture, consistent with
respect for this basic right, must extend to all persons the cultural
resources that enable them critically to explore, define, express, and revise
the identifications central to free moral personality. 91 The constitutional
evil condemned by suspect classification analysis is the systematic
deprivation of this basic right to a group of persons, unjustly degraded
from their status as persons entitled to respect for the reasonable exercise
of their free moral powers in the identifications central to an ethical life
based on mutual respect. To deny such a group, already the subject of a
long history and culture of moral degradation, their culture-creating rights
is to silence in them the very voice of their moral freedom, rendering
unspoken and unspeakable the sentiments, experience, and reason that
authenticate the moral personality that a political culture of human rights
owes each and every person-including, as we saw earlier, their moral
powers to know and claim their basic rights and to protest injustice on such
grounds. Sexual preference is a suspect classification because homosexuals
are today victimized by irrational political prejudices rooted in this radical
political evil which denies them the cultural resources of free moral
personality, in particular, the inalienable human right of conscience.
Such political prejudice is an evil, subject to suspect classification
analysis, regardless of the form of erotic and emotional life in which a
compulsory' sterilization after a third conviction for a felony involving "moral
turpitude," excluding such felonies as embezzlement). Skinner stands for the
proposition that a white collar/blue collar distinction is constitutionally unreasonable
under equal protection principles, even if the state could require sterilization under a
more reasonable, even-handed program.
90 For a related development of this analysis, see Halley, supra note 68.
91 For development of this theme, see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM,




homosexual finds fulfillment.92 There is as great a variety and range in the
erotic intimacy and personal relations of homosexuals as there is of
heterosexuals. It includes not only the sodomy obsessively focused on in
Bowers v. Hardwick,93 but various other sex acts and indeed all forms of
erotic intimacy like holding, caressing, kissing and touching, and the other
manifoldly variegated playful expressions of human love, most of which
could not reasonably be supposed to be governed by Bowers (could a
caress of one's same-sex beloved in the privacy of one's home be
constitutionally condemned as criminal, and privacy retain any shred of
dignity as a central constitutional value of free people?). Indeed,
homosexual erotic life may be embedded in complex, symbolically
elaborated, and idealized forms of intense, deeply loving relationships in
which sex acts as such are not in play, but the tender humane mutualities of
nurture, transparent understanding, play, concern, and commitment that
arise from a common sensibility and imaginative life, conscientious way of
thinking and feeling, and shared experience. What is decisively in play in
American life today is the claim for self-respecting public and private
identity as lesbian and gay persons, in particular, the right to a life and
culture, reflecting and expressing one's moral powers, on terms free of a
rights-denying political irrationalism that would aggressively silence minds
and hearts competent to understand, feel, and protest rank injustice both in
public and private life callously done them by sectarian religious bigots.
The political prejudice of homophobia remains the same evil of radical
cultural intolerance, whatever the sex life in question or not in question,
because it denies the cultural space through which persons of homosexual
preference may reasonably define and identify themselves with a life of
personal and ethical self-respect on whatever terms best give expression to
their free moral powers. The suspectness of sexual preference arises
precisely from the target of irrationalist homophobia on the claim of
lesbian and gay identity to the right of conscience, and should be
constitutionally condemned for this reason. 94
92 See generally Halley, supra note 68.
93 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
94 For an argument along these lines, albeit not claiming to address the status of
sexual preference as a full suspect classification, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Mikva, I.), reh'g en banc granted andjudgrnent vacated, (Jan. 7, 1994).
Steffan is distinguishable from predecessor appellate court decisions in one striking
respect. In Steffan, the discharged service member did not admit to, nor did the Navy
claim, any improper-specifically, homosexual-conduct on his part. For earlier
cases, see, for example, Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 103 (1990); Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir.
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Another way of making the same point is to observe that homophobic
prejudice, like racism and sexism, unjustly distorts the idea of human
rights applicable to both public and private life. The political evil of racism
expressed itself in a contemptuous interpretation of black family life which
was enforced by antimiscegenation laws that confined blacks, as a separate
species, to an inferior sphere. 95 The political evil of sexism expressed itself
in a morally degraded interpretation of private life in which women, as
morally inferior, were confined as, in effect, a different species.96 In
similar fashion, the evil of homophobic prejudice is its degradation of
homosexual love to the unspeakably private and secretive, not only
politically and socially, but also intrapsychically in the person whose
sexuality is homosexual. The intellectual reign of terror-that we earlier
saw aims to impose racism and anti-Semitism on the larger society, even
on these stigmatized minorities themselves-aims to enforce homophobia at
large and self-hating homophobia in particular on homosexuals as well. Its
vehicle is the degradation of lesbian and gay identity as a devalued form of
conscience with which no one, under pain of ascribed membership in such
a devalued species, can or should identify. Such degradation constructs
not, as in the case of gender, merely a morally inferior sphere, but an
unspeakably and inhumanly evil sphere-a culturally constructed and
imagined diabolic hell to which lesbians and gays must be compulsively
exiled on the same irrationalist mythological terms by which societies we
condemn as primitive exiled devils, witches, and werewolves. 97 Lesbians
and gays are thus culturally defined as a nonhuman or inhuman species
whose moral interests in love and friendship and nurturing care are, in
their nature, radically discontinuous with anything recognizably human.
The culture of such degradation is pervasive and deep, legitimating the
uncritically irrationalist outrage at the very idea of lesbian and gay
marriage, 98 which unjustly constructs the inhumanity of homosexual
1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984). For one
opinion that ruled on homosexual status, not alleged or admitted misconduct, and
relied on the military reasoning rejected by Judge Mikva as constitutionally defective,
see Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nor. Ben-
Shalom v. Stone, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
95 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding antimiscegenation laws
to be unconstitutional expression of racial prejudice).
96 See FADERMAN, SuRPAssINa, supra note 59, at 85-86, 157-58, 181, 236.
97 On the imaginative processes that sustain such a sphere, see generally ALAN E.
BERNSTEIN, THE FORMATION OF HELL: DEATH AND RETRmuTIoN IN THE ANCIENT AND
EARLY CHRISTIAN WORLDs (1993).
98 For a powerful argument for same-sex marriages as a matter of constitutional
justice, see Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
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identity on the basis of exactly the same kind of viciously circular cultural
degradation unjustly imposed on African-Americans through
antimiscegenation laws. 99 Groups, thus marked off as ineligible for the
central institutions of intimate life and cultural transmission, are deemed
subculturally nonhuman or inhuman, an alien species incapable of the
humane forms of culture that express and sustain our inexhaustibly varied
search, as free moral persons, for enduring personal and ethical meaning
and value in living.
The political evil of this prejudice, based on the compulsory secrecy of
the preference, is not always ameliorated and may indeed sometimes be
aggravated by the growing practice of either not enforcing or repealing or
otherwise invalidating criminal laws against homosexual sex. Such
developments-without comparable antidiscrimination guarantees against
homophobic prejudice-legitimate the ancient idea of something
unspeakably and properly private, something all the more outrageous if
given any public expression whatsoever (thus, legitimating sexist violence
against forms of public expression of homosexual preference). 1°° But such
compulsory privatization insults homosexuals in the same way it
traditionally insulted African-Americans and women. It deprives them as
moral persons of their right to speak, feel, and live as whole persons on
the terms of public and private life best expressive of their free moral
powers. This freedom is the moral right of every person in a free society
and lesbian and gay persons have a right to it on equal terms.
It is for this reason that, in my judgment, appropriate constitutional
remedies for homophobic prejudice include the range of remedies
appropriate in the case of race and gender. I include among these remedies,
in contrast to some commentators,101 affirmative action because the
underlying constitutional concern should be the reasonable deconstruction
of the compulsory privatization of homosexual preference. Homosexuals
Antimdscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 981 (1991); see also Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (finding strict scrutiny analysis to be applicable and
holding denial of marriage license to same-sex couple to be violative of the Hawaii
constitutional guarantee of equal protection). For historical background on unions
regarded as analogous to modern claims for same-sex marriage, see William N.
Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993).
99 For eloquent development of this point, see Andrew Koppelman, The
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
100 C. Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431
(1992).
101 See RUSE, supra note 41, at 265-67. For a good general treatment of the need
for antidiscrimination protections for homosexuals, see RICHARD D. MOHR,
GAYs/JusTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 137-211 (1988).
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cannot justly be required to be secretive as the condition of fair access to
public goods. To the extent they are so required, they suffer unjust
discrimination on grounds of sectarian religious prejudice. Such prejudice
can, as in the case of race and gender, be appropriately remedied by
appropriate affirmative action plans that both insure that the qualifications
of public homosexuals are fairly assessed and that the presence of such
homosexuals in various positions challenges and undermines political
prejudice in society at large.
As my earlier analysis of the basis of the Western condemnation of
homosexuality suggests, homophobia may be reasonably understood today
as a persisting form of residual and quite unjust gender discrimination.102
The nonprocreative character of homosexual sexuality may be of relatively
little concern, but its cultural symbolism of disordered gender roles excites
anxieties in a political culture still quite unjustly sexist in its understanding
of gender roles. Indeed, the condemnation of homosexuality acts as a
reactionary reinforcement of sexism generally. Importantly, the emergence
of the modem conception of homosexual identity, as intrinsically
effeminate (in gay men), and later mannish (in lesbians), 10 3 accompanied
the emergence of modem Western culture after 1700, and was associated
with the reinforcement of the sexist definition of gender roles in terms of
which the supposedly greater equality of men and women was
interpreted.'04 Male homosexuals as such were thus symbolically
understood as "effeminate members of a third or intermediate gender, who
surrender their rights to be treated as dominant males, and are exposed
instead to a merited contempt as a species of male whore" 05 (in the more
overtly sexist and homophile ancient Greek world, only the passive male
partner would be thus interpreted).106 Homosexuals as such-both lesbians
and gay men-are, on this persisting modem view, in revolt against what
many still suppose to be the "natural" order of gender hierarchy: women
or men, as the case may be, undertaking sexual roles improper to their
102 Cf. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988).
103 On the later development of lesbian identity, see FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS,
supra note 59; CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF
GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 245-97 (1985).
104 See generally Randolph Trumbach, Gender and the Homosexual Role in
Modern Western Culture: The 18th and 19th Centuries Compared, in
HOMOSEXUALITY, WHICH HoMOsExuALITY?: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAY
AND LESBIAN STUDIES 149, 149-69 (1989).
105 Id. at 153.
106 For a probing recent study, see EVA CANTARELLA, BISEXUALITY IN THE
ANCIENT WORLD (Cormac 0. Cuilleanain trans., 1992) (1987).
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gender (for example, women loving other women independent of men,10 7
dominance in women, and passivity in men). It is plainly unjust to display
such sexist views, no longer publicly justifiable against heterosexual
women, against a much more culturally marginalized and despised group,
the symbolic scapegoats of the feeble and cowardly sense of self that seeks
self-respect in the unjust degradation of morally innocent people of good
will. Homosexuals have the right, on grounds of suspect classification
analysis, to be protected from such irrational prejudice. In particular, they
have the constitutional right, as a matter of principle, to be protected from
the expression through public law of sectarian religious prejudice, targeted
specifically against claims for justice by lesbian and gay identity based on
the reasonable elaboration of constitutional principles of antidiscrimination
and privacy now accepted for all other persons. The sexist roots of modem
homophobia should only confirm the irrationalism of the prejudice and the
constitutional illegitimacy of its unprincipled expression through public law
against one group and one group exclusively: namely, a small and
traditionally despised minority, the legitimacy of whose claims are most
invisible to public opinion.
It is sexist prejudice of this sort that accounts, in my judgment, for the
area of our national public life that is most conspicuously and unashamedly
homophobic, the American military. 108 I have noted elsewhere the damage,
caused by political liberalism's complicity with sexism, inflicted on the
political culture's interpretation of basic human rights (i.e., a
hypermasculinized vision of the content and scope of human rights). 10 9
Exclusion of women from the military surely reflects this
misinterpretation,110 and the exclusion of homosexuals is a continuing
variation on the same sexist theme.
People serving in the military must satisfy the reasonable requirements
for which such service calls, but these requirements have little to do with
107For commentary on the sexism of heterosexism, see Adrienne Rich,
Conpulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 227, 227-54 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
108 For an excellent and probing analysis of this issue, see Seth Harris, Note,
Permittng Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Deference, and the
Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from the Milirmy, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 171 (1989-90); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499 (1991).
109 See RICHARDs, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 178-91.
110 For the Supreme Court's insensitivity to this issue, see Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding as constitutional a gender-based statute authorizing the
registration for the draft of men but not women).
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gender as such"'1 and nothing to do with sexual preference. 112 The
confusion of the military virtues of courage and competence with
traditional ideas of manliness (including aggressive heterosexual virility) is,
at bottom, transparently sexist (as if a woman or homosexual in the
military must be either the perpetrator or victim of sexual harassment). It
morally insults both women and homosexuals to ascribe to them
incapacities of moral control or susceptibilities that reflect and reinforce
irrational prejudice in this way. It also disfigures what military service is
and should be in the defense of a constitutional culture of human rights.
Military service is a part of that culture and should reflect its best
values and aspirations. However, instead of distributing rights and
responsibilities on terms that respect all persons as equal members of the
political community, the military has been cordoned off from the larger
fabric of constitutional principle, a judicially protected bastion of sexist
prejudice exempt from reasonable constitutional analysis. 113  This
differential treatment is to make of military service not the defense of
constitutional values, but their subversion in this last sectarian sanctuary of
a corruptly hypermasculinized interpretation of equal rights and
responsibilities.
III. ANTI-LESBIAN/GAY INITIATiVES AS CONSTITUTIONALLY
INVIDIOUS RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE
We need now to bring this alternative perspective to bear on the
analysis of the constitutionality of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives. These
initiatives, exemplified by Colorado Amendment Two, 114 constitutionally
entrench a prohibition on laws that forbid discrimination on grounds of
sexual preference in a much more bald and visibly invidious way than the
comparable initiatives struck down by the Supreme Court as entrenching
constitutionally invidious racial and religious discrimination. 1 5
11 Even the gender-based combat exclusion of women may in contemporary
circumstances be largely unreasonable, as Kenneth Karst has recently argued with
great force. See Karst, supra note 108, at 529-45.
112 See id. at 545-63.
113 See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. at 57.
114 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115 Unlike the facially neutral California amendment in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967), Colorado Amendment Two explicitly singles out lesbians and gay
men as a group. The Colorado amendment, in contrast to the California amendment,
also constitutionally entrenches not only a prohibition on laws against private
discrimination, but against public discrimination as well. Amendment Two also
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As I have already argued, discrimination on grounds of sexual
preference is, in its nature, a form of religious intolerance, a ground for
suspectness older than the Equal Protection Clause itself. The Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment thus condemns as suspect burdens
placed on exercise of conscientious convictions unsupported by a
compelling secular justification. 116 And its companion, the Establishment
Clause, renders suspect state support of sectarian religious views in
contexts that encourage the teaching of and conversion to such views.117
The state may not discriminate either against or in favor of sectarian
religious conscience, but must extend equal respect to all forms of
imposes a more burdensome requirement than the Akron amendment invalidated in
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). First, rather than requiring a majority of a
particular city, any successful repeal effort of Amendment Two requires the approval
of an entire state. Second, the amendment struck down in Hunter was neutral among
claims of any group based on race, religion, or national ancestry whereas Colorado
Amendment Two also specifically singles out lesbians and gay men as a group.
116 See RIcHARDs, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 141-46. Free exercise analysis
was somewhat narrowly interpreted in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding religiously inspired peyote use not constitutionally exempt from
neutral criminal statute criminalizing such use, and thus permitting the state to deny
employment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such use). The
case, however, notably acknowledges the continuing authority of leading free exercise
cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the denial of state
unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist because of her refusal to work on
sabbath day to be an unconstitutional burden on her free exercise rights), and
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state compulsory education
law unconstitutionally burdens free exercise rights of Amish parents to remove
children from school after eighth grade). In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), the Supreme Court clarified that Smith in
no way limited the availability of free exercise analysis of a state law that nonneutrally
targeted a specific religion (in this case, criminalizing animal sacrifice in Santeria
religious rituals). The authority of Smith itself is in doubt in light of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West Supp.
1993). For commentary thereon, see Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FORDHAM L. Rv. 883 (1994). The
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 itself will have to
be assessed in light of whether, on grounds of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
constitutionally expands or unconstitutionally contracts the constitutional right
judicially defined by the Supreme Court in its free exercise jurisprudence, including
Smith. For relevant case law on this question, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966).117 See RIpCHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 146-62.
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conscience. State-imposed discrimination on grounds of sexual preference
violates such equal respect for all forms of conscience.
Such discrimination takes objection to a conscientious form of moral
thought and sensibility precisely because it makes public ethical claims to
respect for a private and public identity on equal terms with the other
forms of self-organized identity central to the right of conscience (i.e., the
wide range of religious and irreligious views protected by both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment). 118
Lesbian and gay identity-whether irreligiously, nonreligiously, or
religiously grounded-is decidedly one among these views. Such identity is
118 Under the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has tended, in the
interest of reasonably developing the basic value of equality, to expand the
constitutional concept of religion to protect conscience as such from coercion or undue
burdens. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (declaring
congressional statutory exemption from military service-limited to religiously
motivated conscientious objectors to all wars-extended to all who conscientiously
object to all wars); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (upholding
congressional statutory exemption from military service for people who were
religiously motivated conscientious objectors to all wars); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961) (declaring unconstitutional a state requirement that state officials must
swear belief in God); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 79 (1944) (forbidding any
inquiry into the truth or falsity of beliefs in a mail fraud action against the bizarre "I
am" movement of Guy Ballard (alias "Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and
Godfre Ray King")). But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(holding religiously inspired peyote use not exempt from general prohibition on such
drug use and thus may be properly invoked by state to deny unemployment benefits to
persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use); but c.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(West Supp. 1993). For commentary thereon, see Laycock, supra note 116. And
under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has notably insisted that the public
education curriculum may not privilege sectarian religious rituals and views over
-others. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding
nondenominational prayer at high school graduation to be violative of the
Establishment Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (finding state
statute requiring balanced treatment of creationist and evolution science to be violative
of the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (holding
state authorization of one-minute period of silence in public schools "for meditation or
voluntary prayer" to be violative of the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding state statute forbidding teaching of evolution in public
schools to be violative of the Establishment Clause); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding reading of selections from Bible and Lord's Prayer in
public schools to be violative of the Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (finding use of state-composed nondenominational prayer in public schools
to be violative of the Establishment Clause).
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grounded in critically conscientious convictions both about the empowering
personal and moral good of homosexual friendship and love (grounded in
the basic human good of love) and arguments of public reason about the
injustice and ethical wrong of its condemnation and marginalization
(centering on the unprincipled failure to respect the self-authenticating right
of all persons to the humane and basic good of love). The identity
expresses itself in varied personal and political associations of mutual
recognition, support, and respect, and in demands for equal justice and for
a public culture-including institutional formsn 9-adequate to the
reasonable elaboration and cultivation of its ethical vision of humane value
in public and private life. Both its constructive and critical arguments are,
in their nature, ethical arguments of public reason, appealing to the
fundamental and broadly shared ethical imperative of treating persons as
equals. 120
Such conscientious claims to personal and moral identity are based on
the constitutionally guaranteed right to conscience. The constitutional
protections for liberty of conscience, grounded on equal respect for
conscience, have not been and cannot reasonably be limited to established
or traditional churches, for the American tradition of liberty of conscience
has extended to and indeed fostered the many new forms of conscience that
arose uniquely in America, 121 including the claims of conscience expressed
through the abolitionist movement that were so sharply critical of
established churches.' 2 2 Claims to lesbian and gay identity stand foursquare
119 These institutions include, in my judgment, an appropriate framework for
public recognition and legitimation, on fair terms, of the rights of intimate association
of lesbians and gays as couples and, where appropriate, as parents.
120 On the pervasiveness of this ideal in Western religious and ethical culture, see
RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 69, 71, 78, 93, 123-28, 134, 272-73, 275.
For an exploration of the form, content, and force of the critical and constructive
aspects of these ethical arguments on behalf of lesbian and gay identity, see id. at
269-80; DAvID AJ. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 29-83 (1982);
David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A
Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957
(1979); David AJ. Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy:
A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1977).
121 See generally SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 491-509 (1972) (e.g., Shakers, Society of the Public Universal
Friend, New Harmony, Oneida Community, Hopedale, Brook Farm, Mormons); id. at
1019-33 (e.g., Science of Health [Christian Science], New Thought, Positive
Thinking); id. at 1059-78 (e.g., Black Pentecostalism, Father Divine, Sweet Daddy
Grace, Nation of Islam, Booker T. Washington, Martin Luther King).122 For specific elaboration and defense of this point, see Richards, supra note
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in this distinguished tradition of new forms of dissenting conscience and
are, as such, fully entitled to constitutional protection on terms of
principle. Correlatively, the American tradition of religious liberty has not
been and cannot be limited to theistic forms of conscience as such, but
embraces all forms of conscience. 123 Nor has the tradition been limited to
protect only the conscientious identities in which one has been born, for its
guarantees are no less for recent converts and include robust guarantees of
state neutrality in circumstances that would lend the state's sectarian
encouragement to conversion to one form of belief as opposed to
another. 124 All forms of conscientious conviction, whether old or new,
theistic or nontheistic, are thus guaranteed equal respect on terms of a
constitutional principle that renders issues of conscience morally
independent of factionalized politics.
It would trivialize such guarantees, indeed render them nugatory, not
to extend them precisely when they are most constitutionally needed:
namely, to nonmajoritarian claims of conscience that challenge traditional
wisdom on nonsectarian grounds of public reason. Otherwise, the mere
congruence of sectarian belief among traditional religions (e.g., about the
alleged unspeakable evil of homosexuality) would be, as it was in
antebellum America on the question of slavery, 125 the measure of religious
liberty in particular and human and constitutional rights in general. The
traditional orthodoxy, to which any form of dissenting conscience takes
objection on grounds of public reason, would be permitted to silence as
unworthy the newly emancipated voice of such progressive claims of
justice. In effect, the culture of degradation that sets the terms of social
death to which homosexuals have unjustly been condemned would, on this
view, set the terms of argument on their behalf. However, it is precisely
such claims to justice of dissenting, antimajoritarian conscience that most
require, on grounds of principle, constitutional protection against nescient
majorities who would aggressively and uncritically repress such a group on
the ground of its daring to make claims to justice critical of the dominant
religio-cultural orthodoxy (the aim that Colorado Amendment Two
repressively aims to accomplish).
Finally, the ground for discrimination against lesbian and gay
conscience, thus understood, is itself, as I earlier suggested, based on
sectarian religious convictions-sectarian in the sense that they rest on
68; see also RIcHARDs, CoNsciENcE, supra note 26, at 58-107.
123 See supra note 118. For further development of this argument, see RICHARDS,
TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 67-162.
124 For fuller discussion, see RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 146-62.
125 For further development of this point, see Richards, supra note 68.
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perceptions internal to religious convictions and not on public arguments
available in contemporary terms to all persons. 126 This is confirmed, as I
earlier suggested, by the failure to extend to lesbian and gay persons public
arguments about the acceptability of nonprocreational sex and
unacceptability of sexism otherwise available to all persons on fair terms.
The expression through public law of one form of sectarian conscience
against another form of conscience, without compelling justification in
public arguments available to all, is constitutionally invidious, and
therefore constitutionally suspect religious intolerance. It both
unconstitutionally burdens conscience inconsistent with free exercise
principles, and unconstitutionally advances sectarian conscience
inconsistent with antiestablishment principles. Discrimination specifically
directed against the claims of justice made by and on behalf of lesbian and
gay conscience expresses such constitutionally forbidden intolerance.
If discrimination against persons on grounds of sexual preference
expresses constitutionally forbidden religious intolerance, the constitutional
entrenchment of prohibitions on such discrimination-specifically naming a
group in terms of the claims of justice it makes-is unashamedly in service
of such discrimination, and, as such, an unconstitutional expression of
religious intolerance through public law. The character of the advocacy for
such initiatives confirms the grounds for constitutional concern. As I more
fully argue below, advocacy groups standardly distort the true nature of
their organizations, rely upon discredited experts and facts, and conceal the
true purpose of the proposed legislation. 127 Such irrationalist distortion of
facts and values, in polemical service of a dominant orthodoxy now under
reasonable examination, is at the core of the political irrationalism
condemned by the argument to toleration central to American
constitutionalism. 128
While the issue has usually been discussed in terns of the cases
forbidding constitutional entrenchment of laws forbidding racial
discrimination, the more exact analogy would be constitutional
entrenchment of prohibitions on claims of religious discrimination made
precisely by groups most likely to be victimized in Christian America by
126 In its position paper, Colorado for Family Values, the sponsor of Colorado
Amendment Two, invoked sectarian religious arguments to justify the initiative: "Gay
behavior is what the Bible calls 'sin' because sin defines any attempt to solve human
problems or meet human needs without regard to God's wisdom and solutions as found
in Scripture and in His saving grace and mercy .... " Niblock, supra note 4, at 157
n.17.
127 See Note, supra note 2, at 1909.
128 See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 63-73.
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such discrimination (i.e., Jews). To understand the force of this analogy,
we must be clear about the nature of the constitutional evil of the
expression of anti-Semitism through law, in particular, why such political
anti-Semitism violates the argument for toleration central to the proper
interpretation of American traditions of religious liberty. 129
The argument for toleration was a judgment of and response to
perceived abuses of political epistemology. The legitimation of religious
persecution by both Catholics and Protestants (drawing authority from
Augustine, 130 among others) had imposed a politically entrenched view of
religious and moral truth as the measure of permissible ethics and religion,
including the epistemic standards of inquiry and debate about religious and
moral truth. By the late seventeenth century (when Locke and Bayle
wrote), 131 there was good reason to believe that such politically entrenched
views of religious and moral truth, resting on the authority of the Bible and
associated interpretive practices, assumed reasonably contestable
interpretations of a complex historical interaction between Pagan, Jewish,
and Christian cultures in the early Christian era. 132
The Renaissance rediscovery of Pagan culture and learning reopened
the question of how the Christian synthesis of Pagan philosophical and
Jewish ethical and religious culture was to be understood. Among other
things, the development of critical historiography and techniques of textual
interpretation had undeniable implications for reasonable Bible
interpretation. 133 The Protestant Reformation both assumed and further
encouraged these new modes of inquiry, and encouraged as well the appeal
to experiment and experience that were a matrix for the methodologies
associated with the rise of modem science.' 34 These new approaches to
thought and inquiry had made possible the recognition that there was a gap
between the politically entrenched conceptions of religious and moral truth
and inquiry and the kinds of reasonable inquiries that the new approaches
made available. The argument for toleration arose from the recognition of
this disjunction between the reigning political epistemology and the new
epistemic methodologies.
The crux of the problem was this: politically entrenched conceptions of
129 See id. on the argument for toleration. See generally RICHARDS, TOLERATION,
supra note 17.
130 See RiCHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 86-88.
131 See id. at 89-98.
132 See id. at 25-27, 84-98, 105, 125.
133 See id. at 125-26.
134 For a recent review of the question, see PURITANISM AND THE RISE OF
MODERN ScImNCE: THE MERTON THESIS (I. Bernard Cohen ed., 1990).
[Vol. 55:491
SEXUAL PREFERENCE
truth had, on the basis of the Augustinian legitimation of religious
persecution, made themselves the measure both of the standards of
reasonable inquiry and of who could count as a reasonable inquirer after
truth. But, in light of the new modes of inquiry now available, such
political entrenchment of religious truth was reasonably seen often to rest
not only on the degradation of reasonable standards of inquiry, but on the
self-fulfilling degradation of the capacity of persons reasonably to conduct
such inquiries. In order to rectify these evils, the argument for toleration
forbade, as a matter of principle, the enforcement by the state of any such
conception of religious truth. Rather, the scope of legitimate political
concern must rest on the pursuit of general ends like life and basic rights
and liberties (e.g., the right to conscience). The pursuit of such goods was
consistent with the full range of ends free people might rationally and
reasonably pursue. 135
A prominent feature of the argumefit for toleration was its claim that
religious persecution corrupted conscience itself, a critique central to the
use of the argument by American abolitionist thinkers in the antebellum
period who assumed the argument as the basis for their criticism of
American slavery and racism 136 (and, in the case of a few, sexism as
well).137 Such corruption, a kind of self-induced blindness to the evils one
inflicts, is a consequence of the political enforcement at large of a
conception of religious truth that immunizes itself from independent
criticism in terms of reasonable standards of thought and deliberation. In
effect, the conception of religious truth, though perhaps having once been
importantly shaped by more ultimate considerations of reason, ceases to be
held or to be understood and elaborated on the basis of reason.
A tradition, which thus loses its sense of its reasonable foundations,
stagnates and depends increasingly for allegiance on question-begging
appeals to orthodox conceptions of truth and the violent repression of any
dissent from such conceptions as a kind of disloyal moral. treason. The
politics of loyalty rapidly degenerates, as it did in the antebellum South's
repression of any criticism of slavery, into a politics that takes pride in
widely held community values solely because they are community values.
Standards of discussion and inquiry become increasingly parochial and
insular; they serve only a polemical role in the defense of the existing
community values and are indeed increasingly hostile to any more impartial
reasonable assessment in light of independent standards. 138
135 See RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 119-20.
136 See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 59-63, 73-89.
137 See Richards, supra note 68, at 795.
138 See generally JoHN H. FRANKLIN, THE MirrANT SouTH 1800-1861 (1956);
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Such politics tends to forms of irrationalism in order to protect its now
essentially polemical project: opposing views relevant to reasonable public
argument are suppressed, facts are distorted or misstated, values are
disconnected from ethical reasoning, and deliberation in politics is
denigrated in favor of violence against dissent and the aesthetic
glorification of violence. Paradoxically, the more the tradition becomes
seriously vulnerable to independent reasonable criticism (indeed,
increasingly in rational need of such criticism), the more it is likely to
generate forms of political irrationalism, including scapegoating of outcast
dissenters, in order to secure allegiance.
I call this phenomenon the paradox of intolerance. The paradox is to be
understood by reference to the epistemic motivations of Augustinian
intolerance. 139 A certain conception of religious truth was originally
affirmed as true and was politically enforced on society at large because it
was supposed to be the epistemic measure of reasonable inquiry (i.e., more
likely to lead to epistemically reliable beliefs). But the consequence of the
legitimation of such intolerance over time was that standards of reasonable
inquiry, outside the orthodox measure of such inquiry, were repressed. In
effect, the orthodox conception of truth was no longer defended on the
basis of reason, but was increasingly hostile to reasonable assessment in
terms of impartial standards not hostage to the orthodox conception.
Indeed, orthodoxy. was defended as an end in itself, increasingly by
nonrational and even irrational means of appeal to community identity and
the like. The paradox appears in the subversion of the original epistemic
motivations of the Augustinian argument. Rather than securing reasonable
inquiry, the argument now has cut off the tradition from such inquiry.
Indeed, the legitimacy of the tradition feeds on irrationalism precisely
when it is most vulnerable to reasonable criticism, contradicting and
frustrating its original epistemic ambitions.
The history of religious persecution amply illustrates these truths and,
as the abolitionists clearly saw, no aspect of that history more clearly does
so than Christian anti-Semitism. The relationship of Christianity to its
Jewish origins has always been a tense and ambivalent one. 140 The fact that
many Jews did not accept Christianity was a kind of standing challenge to
the reasonableness of Christianity, especially in its early period (prior to its
W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941).
139 See RICHARDs, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 86-88.
140 For a useful study of the early Christian period, see JOHN A. GAGER, THE
ORiGINs OF ANTI-SEmrrisM (1983). The classic general study is LEON POLIAKOV, THE




establishment as the church of the late Roman Empire) when Christianity
was a proselytizing religion that competed for believers with the wide
range of religious and philosophical alternative belief systems available in
the late Pagan world.
In his recent studies of anti-Semitism, 141 the medievalist Gavin
Langmuir characterizes as anti-Judaism Christianity's long-standing
worries about the Jews because of the way the Jewish rejection of
Christianity discredited the reasonableness of the Christian belief system in
the Pagan world. Langmuir argues that the Christian conception of the
obduracy of the Jews and the divine punishment of them for such obduracy
were natural forms of anti-Judaic self-defense, resulting in the forms of
expulsion and segregation from Christian society that naturally expressed
and legitimated such judgments on the Jews. 142 In contrast, Langmuir
identifies anti-Semitism proper as the totally baseless and irrational beliefs
about ritual crucifixions and cannibalism of Christians by Jews that were
"widespread in northern Europe by 1350."143 Such beliefs led to populist
murders of Jews usually, though not always, condemned by both church
and secular authorities.
Langmuir suggests, as does R.I. Moore, 144 that the development of
anti-Semitism proper was associated with growing internal doubts posed by
dissenters during the period 950-1250 about the reasonableness of certain
Catholic religious beliefs and practices (e.g., transubstantiation) and the
resolution of such doubts by the forms of irrationalist politics associated
with anti-Semitism proper (often centering on fantasies of ritual eating of
human flesh that expressed the underlying worries about
transubstantiation). The worst ravages of anti-Semitism illustrate the
paradox of intolerance, which explains the force of the example for
abolitionists: precisely when the dominant religious tradition gave rise to
the most reasonable internal doubts, these doubts were displaced from
reasonable discussion and debate into blatant political irrationalism against
one of the more conspicuous, vulnerable, and innocent groups of
dissenters.
Langmuir's distinction between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism proper
is an unstable one. Both attitudes rest on conceptions of religious truth that
141 See GAVIN I. LANmumn, TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ANTISEM1TISM (1990)
[hereinafter LANmUm, DEFNITION]; GAVIN I. LANGMUIR, HISTORY, RELIGION, AND
ANTISEMrrISM (1990) [hereinafter LANGMUIR, HISTORY].
142 See LANUMUIR, DEFINITION, supra note 141, at 57-62.
14 3 Id. at 301-02.
144 See R.I. MOORE, THE FORMATION OF A PERSECUTING SOCIETY: POWER AND
DEVIANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE, 950-1250, at 34-39 (1987).
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are unreasonably enforced on the community at large; certainly, both the
alleged obduracy of the Jews and their just punishment for such obduracy
were sectarian interpretations of the facts and were not reasonably enforced
at large. Beliefs in obduracy certainly are not as unreasonable as beliefs in
cannibalism and segregation is not as evil as populist murder or genocide.
But, both forms of politics are, on grounds of the argument for toleration,
unreasonable in principle. More fundamentally, anti-Judaism laid the
corrupt political foundation for anti-Semitism proper and its twentieth
century modernist irrationalist atrocity, anti-Semitism as racism. 145 Once it
became politically legitimate to enforce at large a sectarian conception of
religious truth, reasonable doubts about such truth were displaced from
reasonable discussion and debate to the irrationalist politics of religious
persecution. The Jews in the Christian West have been the most
continuously blatant victims of such politics, making anti-Semitism "the
oldest prejudice in Western civilization." 146
For this reason, we would and should condemn immediately
constitutional entrenchment of political anti-Semitism-in the form of an
initiative that forbade all laws protecting Jews as such against
discrimination-as an unconstitutional expression of religious intolerance
because such laws serve precisely the forms of majoritarian religious
intolerance against which constitutional guarantees of religious toleration
are, in fact, most exigently needed. A state that entrenched such initiatives
would, in clear violation of free exercise principles, unconstitutionally
burden specifically named, conscientious convictions in a blatantly
nonneutral way, 147 and, would, in clear contradiction of the principles of
our antiestablishment jurisprudence, 148 support a sectarian religious view
as the one true church of Americanism to which all dissenters are
encouraged to convert. A constitutional jurisprudence that condemns as
unconstitutional an unemployment compensation scheme that imposes
financial burdens on the convictions of Seventh Day Adventists1 49 also
must condemn, a fortiori, laws that specifically target for focused
disadvantage the convictions of a religion or form of conscience, and must
regard as even worse the very naming of the group in question in the
145 See RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 156-60.
146 LANGMUIR, DEFINITION, supra note 141, at 45.
147 cy Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct.
2217 (1993) (holding state law forbidding animal sacrifice by the Santeria religion to
be violative of the neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause).
148 See RIcHARDs, TOLERATION, supra note 17, at 146-62.
149 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963). The authority of
Sherbert was reaffirmed in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990)."
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relevant law. 150 In effect, a state that entrenched such initiatives would be
the unconstitutional agent of the political evil of intolerance, branding a
religious group as heretics and blasphemers to American religious
orthodoxy. American constitutionalism, which recognizes neither heresy
nor blasphemy as legitimate expressions of state power, 151 must forbid
exercises of state power, similar to the contemplated initiative, that
illegitimately assert such a power-in this case, legitimating the demonic
evil of political anti-Semitism. The effect of such initiatives would be to
enlist the state actively in the unconstitutional construction of a class of
persons lacking the status of bearers of human rights, a status so subhuman
that they are excluded from the minimal rights and responsibilities of the
moral community of persons. Political atrocity thus becomes thinkable and
practical.
The case of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives is, as a matter of principle,
parallel. A dissenting form of conscience, precisely on the grounds of its
moral independence and dissenting claims for justice, is branded for that
reason as heresy. The message is clear and clearly intended: persons
should convert from this form of conscience that is wholly unworthy of
respect to the only true religion of Americanism. The initiative is as much
motored by sectarian religion and directed against dissenting conscience as
the intolerably anti-Semitic initiative. Homosexuals are to late twentieth
century sectarians what the Jews have traditionally been to sectarians in the
Christian West throughout its history: intolerable heretics to dominant
religious orthodoxy.
The conception that homosexuality is a form of heresy or treason is
both an ancient and a modem ground for its condemnation. 152 In fact, there
150 The imagined case is thus even worse than Lukuni Babalu, in which the
religion of Santeria was not named specifically in the statute found to be directed
unconstitutionally against that religious group.
151 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) ("Heresy trials are
foreign to our Constitution."). For a discussion of the unconstitutionality of blasphemy
prosecutions under current American law of free speech and religious liberty, see
LEONARD W. LEvy, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED FROM MOSES
TO SALMAN RusHDIm 522-33 (1993).
152 Throughout the Middle Ages, homosexuals were prosecuted as heretics, and
often burned at the stake on that ground. DERRICK S. BAILEY, HOMOSEXUALITY AND
THE WESTERN CHRISTIAN TRADITION 135 (1955). As further evidence of the
prosecution of homosexuals as heretics, it is interesting to note that the term
"Buggery," one of the terms used for homosexual acts in English law from the 1500s
to the 1800s, derived from a corruption of the name of one heretical group which
allegedly engaged in homosexual practices. See id. at 141, 148-49. For an analysis of
the modern use of treason in this context, see PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
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is no good reason to believe that the legitimacy of this form of sexual
expression destabilizes social cooperation. Homosexual relations are and
foreseeably will remain the preference of small minorities of the
population, 153 who are as committed to principles of social cooperation and
contribution as any other group in society at large. The issue, as with all
suspect classes, is not one of increasing or decreasing the minority, but one
of deciding whether we should treat such a minority justly with respect as
persons or unjustly with contempt as unspeakably heretical outcasts.
Indeed, the very accusation of heresy or treason illustrates an important
feature of the traditional moral condemnation in its contemporary
vestments. It no longer rests on generally acceptable arguments of
necessary protections of the rights of persons to general goods. To the
contrary, both the sexism and condemnation of nonprocreational sex of the
traditional view are now inconsistent with the reasonable acceptability as
general goods of both gender equality and nonprocreational sex. Today,
such condemnation appeals to arguments internal to highly personal, often
sectarian religious decisions about acceptable ways of belief and lifestyle.
When a moral tradition in this way abandons certain of its essential
grounds in general goods, it justly may retain its legitimacy for those
internal to the tradition, all the more so because it remains more
exclusively constitutive of their tradition. But if those essential grounds are
constitutionally necessary for the tradition coercively to enforce its
mandates through the criminal law, the abandonment of those grounds
must, par! passu, deprive the tradition of its constitutional legitimacy as a
ground for enforcement through law. The tradition now no longer
expresses nonsectarian ethical arguments that may be imposed fairly on all
persons, but rather perspectives reasonably authoritative only for those
who adhere to the tradition.
MORALS 1-25 (1965). For a rebuttal of Patrick Devlin's analysis, see H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); H.L.A. Hart, Social Solidarity and the
Enforcement of Morals, 35 U. CHL L. REv. 1 (1967).
153 The original Kinsey estimate that about four percent of males are exclusively
homosexual throughout their lives is confirmed by comparable European studies. Paul
H. Gebhard, Incidence of Overt Homosexuality in the United States and Western
Europe, in Pub. No. HSM 72-9116, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON
HoMosExuALrY: FINAL REPORT AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 22-29 (T.M. Livingood,
ed., 1972). The incidence figure remains stable even though many of the European
countries do not apply a criminal penalty to consensual homosexual sex acts. See
WALTER BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTrruTIoN 293 (1973). Recent
surveys indicate that as little as one percent of the population may be gay and less than
half of that number may be lesbian. Kim Painter, Only 1% of Men Say They Are Gay,
USA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1993, at IA.
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Tony Honore, the English legal scholar, made clear the essential point
regarding the contemporary status of the homosexual: "It is not primarily a
matter of breaking rules but of dissenting attitudes. It resembles religious
or political dissent, being an atheist in Catholic Ireland or a dissident in
Soviet Russia." 54 In effect, the enforcement of such sectarian perspectives
through law, as through Colorado Amendment Two, is the functional
equivalent of a heresy prosecution: persons of lesbian and gay identity,
precisely in virtue of their conscientious claims to equal justice, are
branded as subhuman heretics to true values, and told unambiguously to
convert or, at a minimum, ashamedly to return to the silence and
invisibility of the closet. The grounds for prohibition are highly personal,
ideological, or political views about which free persons reasonably
disagree. The continuing force of the prohibitions rests not on protection of
the rights of persons, but on fears and misunderstandings directed at the
alien way of life of a small and traditionally condemned minority, as if the
legitimacy of one's own way of life requires the illegitimacy of all others.
Constitutional toleration, which forbids heresy and blasphemy prosecutions
and sharply circumscribes treason prosecutions, 155 must likewise be
extended to condemnations through law that have the political force of
heresy, blasphemy, and treason prosecutions.
Indeed, constitutional arguments of toleration are, if anything, more
needed in this area than obviously conventional forms of religious
discrimination precisely because the uncritical complacencies of American
majoritarian opinion conspicuously fail to recognize the constitutional
dimensions of the issue involved in the case of a traditionally despised and
stigmatized minority, a fact evidently shown by majoritarian acquiescence
in Colorado Amendment Two. As earlier noted, distortions of fact and
value are made and accepted in polemical support of an entrenched
orthodoxy now under reasonable attack.
This reasonable attack has included criticisms of such tradition both for
its mandatory procreational demands and for its sexism. Both of these
criticisms have, under American public law, been expressed significantly
through constitutional principles of privacy and antidiscrimination for the
benefit of the dominant heterosexual majority of both men and women. The
entrenched orthodoxy is now under much reasonable critical attack,
certainly in almost every imaginable aspect of heterosexual sexuality. 156
154 ToNy HONORE, SEX LAW 89 (1978).
155 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
156 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (finding
unconstitutional a state law that placed an undue burden on a woman's ability to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding
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The orthodoxy, now in retreat in the domain of heterosexual sexuality,
does not, however, extend such reasonable criticisms, as a matter of
principle, to the examination of its traditional orthodoxy about homosexual
sexuality. Rather, consistent with the paradox of intolerance as in the case
of Christian reasonable doubts about transubstantiation, it displaces its
doubts from the reasonable doctrinal criticism of which it is most in need
to the irrationalist scapegoating of a traditionally despised and culturally
subjugated minority. In service of that aim, opposing views relevant to
reasonable public argument are suppressed, facts are distorted or misstated,
and values are disconnected from ethical reasoning. Indeed, deliberation in
politics is denigrated in favor of a conception of politics that allegedly, as
we shall see, requires the constitutional repression of dissent, a symbolic
glorification of violence against claims of human rights.
The arguments offered in support of Colorado Amendment Two
exemplify the features of the irrationalist politics associated with the
paradox of intolerance. Six such arguments were examined and rejected by
Judge Bayless in Evans v. Romer:157 (1) the factionalized character of
lesbian and gay identity, 158 (2) its militant aggression, 159 (3) the protection
of existing suspect classes, 160 (4) privacy and religious rights of the
heterosexual majority, 161 (5) not subsidizing political objections of interest
groups, 162 and (6) protecting children. 163 Each argument reflects the
distortions of fact and value central to the paradox of intolerance.
(1) Justifying Colorado Amendment Two as deterring political
factionalism inverts what is, in fact, a political attack on basic human and
constitutional rights into the alleged necessity to defend proper democratic
politics by the repression of dissent. Judge Bayless properly observed that
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting an abortion except pursuant to medical advice
for purpose of saving mother's life); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting doctor or registered pharmacist from
distributing contraception to unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a state law statute forbidding use of
contraception).
157 Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1993).
Judge Bayless examined the arguments in light of the standard of strict scrutiny
required by the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).158 Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 755-56.
159 Id. at 756-57.
160 Id. at 757-58.
161 Id. at 758-59.




"[tihe history and policy of this country has been to encourage that which
defendants seek to deter," concluding that "[t]he opposite of defendants'
first claimed compelling interest is most probably compelling."' 64 The
abuse of the theory of faction in American constitutionalism is a
particularly striking example of the way argument on behalf of Colorado
Amendment Two travesties the American constitutional tradition that it
claims to honor. The theory of faction was developed by James Madison to
identify permanent tendencies of human nature in politics, in particular,
tendencies for groups to bond on the basis of sectarian abridgement of the
legitimate weight owed to the human rights and interests of outsiders. 165
Madison gave particular weight to religious factions because of their
tendency to deny to outsiders respect for their inalienable right to
conscience. 166 It is simply Orwellian for the sectarian advocates of
Colorado Amendment Two to justify its factionalized abuse of American
constitutionalism on the grounds of combating faction. They exemplify the
evil against which they claim to do combat.
(2) Judge Bayless found the argument of combating "militant gay
aggression" 167 to be factually baseless.' 68 Lesbians and gay men are a
small minority of the American population. Although perhaps relatively
affluent 169 and sometimes influential, 170 their political gains have been
164 Id. at 756.
165 For a fuller discussion of the development of the theory of faction, see RICHARDS,
FOUNDATONS, supra note 17, at 32-39.
166 Id.
167 Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 756.
168 Id. at 757.
169 Marketing studies indicate lesbian and gay incomes are far in excess of the
national average. Joya L. Wesley, With $394 Billion in Buying Power, Gays' Money
Talks and Corporate America Increasingly is Listening, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec.
1, 1991, at FS. The 1990 census, measuring statistics for gay unmarried couples for
the first time, showed gay male couples to have higher incomes than any other group,
including heterosexual married couples. Margaret S. Usdansky, Gay Couples, By the
Numbers-Data Suggest They're Fewer Than Believed, But Affluent, USA TODAY, Apr.
12, 1993, at 8A. However, two recent studies have challenged this conception. One
study found that homosexual couples have about the same household incomes as
heterosexual couples of similar education levels, while another study found that
homosexuals generally earned less than similarly situated heterosexuals because of
discrimination. Karen DeWitt, Gay Presence Leads Revival of Declining
Neighborhoods, N.Y. TiES, Sept. 6, 1994, at A14.
170 For a popular media account of gay power and influence, see Joni Balter, Gay
Power Brokers-Money, Stature and Savvy Give Leaders More Cout, SEATTLE TMES,
Aug. 1, 1993, at Al.
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comparatively small, 171 and they remain underrepresented in key
government positions. 172 Against this factual background, an argument of
171 Only a handful of states and a comparatively tiny number of municipalities
protect lesbians and gays from discrimination. Of the 77 jurisdictions that have any
sort of legislation or other government decree protecting lesbians and gay men, 16 are
merely resolutions, guidelines, or policy statements and are not fully binding. See
Affidavit of Political Science Professor Kenneth Sherrill, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (No. 88-3669-
0G), rev'd sub nom Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc
granted and judgment vacated, (Jan. 7, 1994), reprinted in GAYS AND THE MILITARY:
JOSEPH STEFFAN VERSUS THE UNITED STATES 114 (Marc Wolinsky & Kenneth Sherrill
eds., 1993) [hereinafter GAYS AND THE MILITARY]. Only four states--Wisconsin,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Hawaii-have any statewide legislation protecting the
rights of homosexuals, whereas seven others have executive orders issued by
governors. These executive orders are limited by the range of gubernatorial power
and are rescinded more easily than legislation. Id. In half of the states, no jurisdiction
whatsoever has any legislation or other governmental decree or policy that protects the
rights of lesbians and gay men. Id. The importance of this legislation cannot be
overstated. As a recent Harvard Law Review study observes: "[Very little legislation
protects gay men and lesbians from discrimination in the private sector. No federal
statute bars discrimination by private citizens or organizations on the basis of sexual
orientation. Nor do the states provide such protection: only Wisconsin has a
comprehensive statute barring such discrimination in employment." Note,
Developments in 'the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1508,
1667 (1989).
172 The Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), found
women as a class to be relatively politically powerless, despite the fact that then, as
now, they constituted a majority of the electorate, because they were "vastly
underrepresented in this Nation's decisionmaking councils." Id. at 686 n.17. The
Court based its conclusions on the fact that no woman had ever been elected
President; that there had not yet been a woman Supreme Court Justice; that there were
then no women in the United States Senate (although women had served as senators in
the past); and that there were then only 14 women in the House of Representatives. Id.
By this standard, lesbians and gay men are even more underrepresented. There has
never been an openly gay President, nor Supreme Court Justice, nor even an openly
gay federal court judge. There are no openly gay United States Senators today, and
there have never been any. Until 1984, there were no openly gay members of the
United States House of Representatives, and even though there are currently two gay
House members, Congressmen Gerry Studds and Barney Frank, neither revealed his
sexual orientation until after being elected. See Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (No. 88-3669-OG), rev'd
sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc granted and




"militant gay aggression" bespeaks a use of facts and values all too
familiar in the history of intolerance, most grotesquely so in the twentieth
century. Thus, the argument remarkably transforms the minority status of
homosexuals, analogous to the irrationalist appeals central to political anti-
Semitism, into a secret and powerful conspiracy from which politics must
be protected. In effect, the very attempt by homosexuals or Jews to make
any basic claims of equal citizenship and any small gains thus secured,
including relative affluence and occasional influence, are irrationally
interpreted as a murderous attack on dominant majorities. Normative
outrage at the very idea of an outcast's claim of rights remakes reality to
rationalize nullification of such rights. On this hallucinatory ground,
aggression against basic rights of lesbian and gay persons is, as with
Hitler's comparable justification for his war on the Jews, 173 ideologically
inverted into a reasonable "defensive measure" 174 justified on grounds of
self-defense. No other argument offered in defense of Colorado
Amendment Two more starkly communicates the hermetically Manichean
sectarian world view of its proponents-its polemical power to act as a
distorting prism to remake reality in its own ideological image of the wars
of religion and to rationalize its conduct accordingly. The persecutor is
transformed imaginatively into the victim, thereby rendering persecution
innocent and indeed honorable. It is in such terms that good Germans
acquiesced in Hitler's war on the Jews; it is in such terms that good
Americans acquiesced in Colorado's war on lesbian and gay persons.
(3) Judge Bayless rejected the justification of Colorado Amendment
Two as protecting existing suspect classes both because it lacked factual
support and on the normative ground that fiscal concerns were inadequate
to justify abridgement of basic rights and interests. 175 The alleged
justification depends on an uncritical and indefensible inversion of a claim
by lesbian and gay persons to basic equal justice, based on
antidiscrimination principles available to all, into a claim for unequal,
"special" rights, subversive of guarantees of equality. Several courts have
rejected as intrinsically distorting and manipulatively question-begging the
wording of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives and referenda as opposing special
laws for homosexuals. 176 But, the implicit justification of such laws, as
173 For a characteristic example of the inversion of victims into aggressors and
the compelling need to defend against them, see ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 824-27
(Reynal & Hitchcock 1939) (1925-26).
174 Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 756 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
1993).
175 Id. at 757-58.
176 See, e.g., Faipeas v. Municipality of Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214 (Alaska
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combating special rights, reaches the same result. In effect, such polemics
refuse to acknowledge what they are doing and intend to do: forbidding
antidiscrimination laws. They do so by willfully suppressing the issues of
principle common to all antidiscrimination laws, in effect, targeting an
unpopular minority for making the same kind of claim that all other groups
have made for such laws. Popular hostility thus is directed unreasonably at
one form of antidiscrimination law by a rhetoric-confusing
antidiscrimination with affirmative action-that irrationally stimulates
unreflective social prejudice against a group precisely because it makes
claims to antidiscrimination protections on grounds of principle.1 7
(4) Judge Bayless acknowledged that, in contrast to other alleged
compelling state interests, the justification of Colorado Amendment Two in
terms of protecting rights of personal, familial, and religious privacy at
least articulated compelling state interests. 178 He denied, however, that the
amendment in question was, in light of its abridgement of the rights of
homosexuals to nondiscrimination, sufficiently narrowly drawn to achieve
these compelling interests.' 79 In fact, the justification of Colorado
Amendment Two in this manner reveals quite clearly why, in the terms
urged in this Article, the Amendment reflects constitutionally invidious
religious intolerance. As Judge Bayless noted, "[iln the present case, the
religious belief urged by defendants is that homosexuals are condemned by
scripture and therefore discrimination based on that religious teaching is
protected within freedom of religion."180 On this basis, discrimination
1993); Mabon v. Keisling, 856 P.2d 1023 (Or. 1993); Citizens for Responsible
Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), review denied,
No. SO-24940, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 1251 (Cal. Mar. 12, 1992).
177 In effect, such rhetoric unreasonably confuses the case for antidiscrimination
laws with the different, though related, case for affirmative action. Popular animus
against affirmative action thus is brought unreasonably to bear on antidiscrimination
laws as such, when antidiscrimination laws and affirmative action are quite different.
In fact, strong proponents of antidiscrimination laws are sometimes skeptical of
affirmative action. See, for example, Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). There may be a good case for
affirmative action in many areas, including, as earlier suggested in this Article, sexual
preference. But, the case for affirmative action is quite different from that for
antidiscrimination laws. Conflating these questions uniquely in the matter of sexual
preference unreasonably condemns arguments for antidiscrimination laws on grounds
appropriate, if at all, for affirmative action. Such rhetoric irrationally stimulates the
prejudice that antidiscrimination laws should combat.
178 Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 758.
179 Id. at 758-59.
180 Id. at 758.
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against Jews, African-Americans, and women could be similarly justified
as protected by religious freedom because some sectarian interpretation of
the Bible or its equivalent in other religious traditions could and would
regard each of them as condemned. We would reject such an argument in
such cases for the same reason we should reject it in the case of Colorado
Amendment Two: under the basic terms of the American tradition of both
free exercise and antiestablishment, let alone equal protection, the
abridgement of basic rights requires a compelling, secular, nonsectarian
justification.181 The interpretation and justification of American religious
liberty, enforced through Colorado Amendment Two, is, by its own
admission, a sectarian interpretation of the Bible (with which many
religious people in the Christian tradition disagree),182 and, as such, an
unconstitutional expression of religious intolerance through public law. In
the Orwellian world of Colorado Amendment Two, sectarian religion has
become the measure of respect for the inalienable right of conscience.
(5) Judge Bayless rejected the justification of Colorado Amendment
Two as preventing the subsidy of political objectives by focusing on the
example urged in support of it, namely, a landlord forced to rent to a
homosexual couple, and thus forced to accept a political ideology.' 8 3
Bayless found this "remarkable" conclusion to be lacking in authority as
well as "logic," unsupported "by any credible evidence or any cogent
argument." 18 4 The same argument could, of course, be made against all
antidiscrimination laws, which address, of course, acts of discrimination,
not thoughts alone.18 5 On the view taken by this justification for Colorado
Amendment Two, the lowest level of irrational prejudice (about which
everyone agreed) would fix the scope of antidiscrimination laws, and of
course, render them ineffective in the protection of any minority. The
argument is unacceptable as a matter of basic principle in any area of
antidiscrimination law, including race, religion, gender, and sexual
preference, which shows again the unprincipled character of the
181 For a fuller discussion of this argument, see RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra
note 17, at 67-162; RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 63-73.
182 See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 152; JOHN BOSWELL, CHRIsTIANITY, SOCIAL
TOLERANCE AND HoMosExuALITY (1980); JOHN J. MCNEILL, THE CHURCH AND THE
HOMOSEXUAL (1976).
183 Evans v. Romer, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 753, 759 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
1993).
184Id.
185 For assistance on this point, see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993) (holding that penalty enhancement for battery on ground of racial bias against
victim did not violate defendant's free speech rights by purporting to punish his biased
beliefs).
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justifications urged in support of Colorado Amendment Two (the argument
here is urged only against laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of
sexual preference).
(6) Judge Bayless dismissed the defense of Colorado Amendment Two
in terms of protecting children as unsupported by evidence, noting
compelling evidence "that pedophiles are predominantly heterosexuals not
homosexuals." 186 Colorado for Family Values, in its basic position paper
on Amendment Two, had forthrightly espoused a range of such willful
factual distortions by comparing homosexual orientation to "murder, theft,
fraud, necrophilia, bestiality, and pedophiia." 18 7 In effect, elementary
demands by lesbian and gay persons for equal treatment of their claims to
the rights and responsibilities of adult public and private life have been
transmogrified by advocates of Colorado Amendment Two, with no factual
basis whatsoever, into bizarre claims to seduce and exploit the young as
well as to murder and the like. We are, literally, in the same sectarian
imaginative world as medieval anti-Semitism, in which fantasies of
cannibalism became the rationalizing measure of the massacre of the
innocent and the just. There are apparently no self-critical limits of
accountability to fact or argument in a politics driven by the fantasies of
sectarian religious intolerance, as is evident both from the history of anti-
Semitism and from its more recent American expression, the religious war
on lesbian and gay identity. We need now, as much as ever, to remind
ourselves of, to preserve, and to give effect to the American constitutional
tradition of toleration that condemns as indecent a self-deceived and self-
deceiving polemical politics, which through fantasy and fraud creates a
gargantuan appetite for the rights-denying evils upon which it monstrously
feeds.
The perspective of the advocates of Colorado Amendment Two is that
of a now much embattled religious orthodoxy on matters of sexuality and
gender, one that frames its factual and normative distortions, reflected in
all six arguments examined, by the explanatory observation that
homosexuals "often express deep hostility to traditional, Judeo-Christian
moral beliefs and [family] values." 18 8 The terms of its homophobic agenda
are self-consciously those of a larger, religiously sectarian "great cultural
war." 18 9 What makes such a sectarian normative world both plausible and
so politically powerful is precisely the same dynamic that made political
186 Evans, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 759.
187 Niblock, supra note 4, at 170.
188 Id. at 115 n.70.




anti-Semitism plausible and powerful, namely, the paradox of intolerance.
The objection to homosexuals on the basis of their criticism of certain
beliefs reveals this tangled political pathology. In fact, such traditional
religious beliefs have been criticized, on religious and nonreligious
grounds, by a wide range of persons, most of them in fact heterosexual
critics of a religion's indefensible insistence on procreational sexuality and
its sexism.190 Criticisms of these sorts in fact have shaped significantly the
interpretation of basic constitutional principles of both privacy and equal
protection applicable to a wide range of issues relating to sexuality and
gender. 191 Crucially, however, objection is not taken to such heterosexual
critics, who would, as a matter of principle, be as logically prone to such
sectarian condemnation as homosexual critics. But, the paradox of
intolerance, in its nature, defies logic, suppressing internal critical doubts
it might reasonably entertain-or, most probably, does entertain-about
traditional religious views concerning heterosexual sexuality by singling
out one group as the symbolic scapegoats of the embattled religious
orthodoxy. Thus, among all the persons critical of traditional religious
views, only one group is singled out by name by Colorado Amendment
Two, one already the traditional object of unreasoning hatred and
ignorance. The willful dynamics of the paradox of intolerance motor
whatever rationalizing distortions of facts and values support its sectarian
objective. The defense of the human rights of lesbian and gay persons
becomes faction; arguments for such rights, unjust aggression; equality,
inequality; sectarian convictions, the measure of the religious liberty; laws
against discrimination, subsidizing an ideology; and factual falsities, truths.
Such insults to reason bespeak contempt for reason. Their appeal is not
to arguments based on impartial standards of epistemic and practical
reason, which, as evidenced in all six arguments examined, they blatantly
flout. The nerve of their unreasonableness is their failure to extend such
impartial standards to both a certain kind of claim and to the making of
such a claim by lesbian and gay persons. Rather, their intrinsically
irrationalist appeal turns on the manifold strategies of self-deception
through which polemically entrenched convictions conceal from themselves
and others their incoherence and their unreasonable willfulness precisely
when they are under reasonable criticism and debate both internally and
190 For a useful history of such arguments criticizing anticontraception laws, see
generally LINDA GORDON, WoMAN's BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
BIRTH CONTROL IN AMERICA (1977).
191 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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externally in the larger society. 192 The motivation of such strategies centers
here on the grotesquely unreasonable interpretation accorded both the
substance of the claims made and the making of such claims by lesbian and
gay persons, in particular, substantive arguments of basic human rights
claimed by lesbian and gay persons as bearers of human rights. In each of
the six arguments examined, the motivation centers on distortions of fact or
value that aim to rationalize, to those already committed to the traditional
orthodoxy, its failure both to recognize the substance of such arguments
and the right of lesbian and gay persons to make such arguments. The
effort of reasonable justification is simply not recognized or acknowledged
as owing to lesbian and gay persons, as persons. To the contrary, both the
substance and the making of such rights-based claims, as normative claims,
must be denied any factual or normative basis whatsoever. The threat of
lesbian and gay identity is, from this perspective, its expression of the
powers of moral personality to originate legitimate claims of human rights.
It is this perspective and only this perspective that can explain why, in the
case of each of the six arguments examined, claims of lesbian and gay
identity have, as such, been inflated in the irrationalist terms of an
aggressive threat, and why, in service of such irrationalism, the most
minimal standards of intellectual and ethical responsibility in making
political arguments have not been extended to lesbians and gay men as
citizens and as persons. Such unreason violates the basic norms of civility
central to the reasonable justification of political power in a constitutional
democracy. 193 Its unreason strips political power of legitimacy, and renders
it a work of willful political violence that shames our constitutionalism. As
one court observed in striking down a comparable initiative: "All that is
lacking is a sack of stones for throwing."194
Such arguments draw their irrationalist polemical power, in the same
way anti-Semitism drew its political power, from a long history of cultural
exclusion and degradation, in this case, of homosexuals from the Western
religio-moral community. An embattled religious orthodoxy chooses to
suppress its own reasonable doubts about its tradition by choosing one
small, traditionally despised group of dissenters, and engages in a politics
of identity, based on the paradox of intolerance, that effectively demonizes
this group as heretics to moral value in living. The powerful political
192 For an illuminating philosophical study of these issues, see generally DENISE
MEYERSON, FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS (1991).
193 See generally JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LiBERALISM (1993).
194 Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648,




appeal of such polemics rests on a long cultural tradition of radical
subjugation of the group in question, who, traditionally silenced and silent,
barely are recognized as human and certainly are not acknowledged as
persons. In effect, a public opinion, formed on injustice, is aroused
polemically to insist on its status as the measure of justice, and thus
acquiesces in degrading, as Colorado Amendment Two does degrade,
dissenters to its injustice from the very constitutional possibility of a
person of conscience worthy of making elementary claims to justice. The
constitutional evil of this initiative is transparently revealed in and by its
very terms, that is, its constitutional entrenchment of a prohibition on the
claims of justice made by and on behalf of this group and only this group.
Uncritical majoritarian complacency cannot be the measure of human
rights in a constitutional community committed to the theory and practice
of human rights as the measure of the demands that the community
legitimately may make on its citizens.195 Yet, it is precisely such
unreflective complacency that fails to take seriously both the conscientious
character of lesbian and gay identity as one among the legitimate forms of
conscience which a rights-respecting state must treat as equals and the
unconstitutionally sectarian character of the attempt to legitimate
discrimination against such forms of conscience. The measure of
constitutionally protected human rights of toleration cannot be intolerance
itself. Rather, it is such sectarian insularity that requires constitutional
criticism and scrutiny in the interest of protecting human rights, such as
those of lesbian and gay persons, that are now so visibly at threat.
On this view, initiatives such as Colorado Amendment Two
unconstitutionally enlist the state as the agent of the political construction
of intolerance in the same way that, in the earlier parallel example, the
state unconstitutionally constructed political anti-Semitism. In neither case
can or should the fact of a long history of injustice, whether of Christian or
anti-Christian anti-Semitism 196 or the subjugation of women and
homosexuals, be the just measure of constitutional argument. In each of
these cases, the interpretive responsibilities imposed by constitutional
guarantees of basic human rights, such as conscience, must be to resist and
repel the force of such history, precisely when such history is aggressively
used against wholly just claims of constitutional rights made by and on
behalf of a group of persons, such as homosexuals, that has only recently
reclaimed its rights of human nature against a tradition of subjugation and
195 For further development of this point, see RICHARDS, FoUNDATIONs, supra
note 17, at 78-171.
196 For a brief discussion of anti-Christian anti-Semitism, see RICHARDS,
CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 156-57.
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repression. 197
Concern for such a tradition of subjugation and its vestiges is a matter
of constitutional dimensions in the United States because of the pivotal role
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the structure of the Reconstruction
Amendments, in particular, its constitutionally enforceable judgment of the
wrongness of slavery and involuntary servitude on grounds of their
abridgement of fundamental human rights. 198 This judgment condemns
what can be called moral slavery: 199 the unjust degradation of whole
classes of persons from their status as bearers of human rights into a
servile status. This judgment has been interpreted reasonably to condemn
not only African-American slavery, but also the traditional subjugation of
women. 200 It would also condemn, as a matter of principle, the long
history of Christian Europe's restrictions on Jews (including access to
influential occupations, intercourse with Christians, living quarters, and the
like) justified, as it was by Augustine among others, in the quite explicit
terms of moral slavery: "The Jew is the slave of the Christian." 20 1 In each
of these cases, unjust deprivation of basic human rights to a class of
persons-African-Americans, women, Jews-rendered them into a social
and legal status rationalized as capable only of limited, socially conceived
servile roles.2° 2
Constitutional condemnation of moral slavery applies, as a matter of
principle, to homosexuals for reasons earlier advanced. Homosexuals have
been degraded from their status as bearers of basic human rights, and that
status has been crucial in service of a social and legal role rationalized in
terms of servile cultural marginality to the dominant sexist stereotypes of
the appropriate gender roles of men and women. The analogy to the
rationalization of European anti-Semitism is, again, strikingly similar. Just
as the Jews were condemned to servile status as the slaves of Christians
because of their refusal to convert, lesbians and gay men were and are
197 For a discussion of the relatively recent emergence of a self-identified
homosexual minority in the United States, see generally JOHN D'EMILIo, SExUAL
POLITIcS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983).
198 See RIcHARDs, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 114-16, 121, 129.
199 1 develop this theme in Richards, supra note 68.
200 See, e.g., Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 684-88 (1973). For historical background in the abolitionist movement (most
notably, the Grimke sisters) of the interpretive judgment that the subjection of women
was moral slavery, see Richards, supra note 68.
201 LANGMUIR, HISTORY, supra note 141, at 294.
202 For elaboration of this point in the case of European Jews, see id. at 294-97,
345-46; LANGMUIR, DEFINITION, supra note 141, at 156-57, 165-66.
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condemned to servile marginality because of their dissidence from
conventional gender roles as defined and enforced by the dominant and
now embattled religio-cultural orthodoxy.
The moral slavery of homosexuals today in America indeed may cut
deeper and thus more unjustly into moral personality than that of African-
Americans, women, and Jews. For one thing, the moral slavery of these
latter groups was usually rationalized in terms of some legitimate, albeit
servile, social space that the group might occupy. However, the social
space occupied by homosexuals was and is that of the culturally
unspeakable, which is the ultimate in cultural death and invisibility. For
another, African-Americans and women appeal to and elaborate a heritage
of American antiracist and antisexist dissent at least as old as the
abolitionist movement. 203 Jewish Americans appeal both to a long
historical tradition of learned dissent from Christian orthodoxy and to the
constitutional principles of respect for dissenting conscience central to the
American tradition of free exercise and antiestablishment. 2°4 The critical
resources of the struggle for justice of lesbians and gay men are altogether
more recent and fragile,205 and are certainly not of a strength remotely
commensurate to the strength of their arguments for justice. Indeed, the
very making of such claims is regarded by many Americans as, at best,
laughable, and, at worst, the object of vilifying unreason reflecting a
constitutionally decadent public opinion in which a lowest common
denominator of unreflective majoritarian preferences is taken to be the
measure of human and constitutional rights. A nation, in which majorities
are thus demagogically persuaded, realizes the darkest nightmare of the
tyrannical majority that worried America's constitutional founders. 20 6
It could not be a reasonable constitutional argument of principle that
we should extend only basic protections of civil liberties to groups who
have a significant tradition of dissent already recognized and, to some
extent, vindicated. Indeed, to the contrary, the relative recency and frailty
of claims of constitutional justice to lesbian and gay identity surely render
the constitutional protection of such claims of conscience all the more
203 See generally RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26; see also Richards,
supra note 68.
204 See generally RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 17.
205 For an important recent study of some of these resources, see generally
JONATHAN DOLLIMORE, SEXUAL DISSIDENCE: AUGUSTINE TO WILDE, FREUD TO
FOUCAULT (1991).
206 For James Madison's worries about the tyrannical propensities of majority
rule and the role of constitutionalism in limiting these propensities, see RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 107-09, 135, 180.
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exigent as a matter of constitutional principle.
Both the recency and frailty of the critical resources of lesbian and gay
identity reflect not the merits of their case, but the extraordinary history of
moral subjugation of homosexuals and, as earlier discussed, the reality-
shaping power with which that dehumanizing history still so powerfully
affects many Americans in the late twentieth century. In effect, one of the
graver forms of constitutionally condemned traditions of moral slavery still
flourishing in the late twentieth century is, precisely in virtue of the power
of the tradition of subjugation, the one most invisible to the complacent
American public mind. In late twentieth century America, such a public
mind is for this reason, so uncritically and so easily polemically aroused to
inflict, with such guiltless self-righteousness, the tyrannies that moral
slavery wreaks on moral personality.
The devastating cultural force of this tradition of subjugation
historically has been its claim of unspeakability, which deprived persons of
homosexual orientation of the resources of speech and thought, and thus,
of critical conscience central to an independent moral life, which is a basic
inalienable right of every person. It is this tradition of compulsory
unspeakability that has responded so aggressively to ethical, political, and
constitutional claims of lesbian and gay identity resting on the deeper claim
to voice and speech, in effect, claiming the most basic right of every
person, the right of conscience. The aggressive target of Colorado
Amendment Two is this claim and this right. The political power of the
unjust tradition of silencing the humanity of homosexuals remains
considerable and is easily deployed, as in passage of Colorado Amendment
Two, to quash the vulnerable voice of recently emancipated conscientious
dissent precisely because of its arguments for justice. This voice is central
to the integrity of American constitutionalism and one most worthy of
constitutional protection. The claims for justice of lesbians and gay men in
the late twentieth century are based on the most insistent demand of
American constitutionalism itself, the right to conscience.
Claims of lesbian and gay identity have this status and force, and the
aggressive attack on these claims, reflected in the complacent majoritarian
nescience underlying the adoption of Colorado Amendment Two,
unconstitutionally enlists the state as the agent not just to deny basic rights,
but to construct the political evil of the intolerant subjugation of persons
from their status as bearers of human rights. As with anti-Semitism, this is
the form of basic dehumanization that renders atrocity thinkable and
practical. It should have no place in a constitutional order committed to




IV. CONSTTUTIONAL ARGUMBNTS AGAINST ANTI-LESBiAN/GAY
INITIATiVEs REVIEWED
It is striking to note that constitutional arguments against anti-
lesbian/gay initiatives earlier discussed fail to bring into play the
alternative perspective on the matters previously proposed. Yet, in each
case, this alternative perspective either clarifies or strengthens the
arguments.
Hans Linde's development of a Guarantee Clause objection to these
initiatives frames its interpretive position with clear reference to what one
may now acknowledge to be the constitutionally protected right to
conscience. Linde urges the force of a Guarantee Clause objection precisely
in those cases most likely to implicate the constitutional evil of politically
powerful religious intolerance. 20 7 Guarantee Clause objections to initiatives
surely have their greatest constitutional force in such contexts and should
be pursued aggressively for this reason.
The argument for the constitutional suspectness of sexual preference is,
if anything, clarified and strengthened by reconceiving the argument in
terms of religious intolerance. In effect, the argument for the suspectness
of sexual preference draws upon the historically oldest and textually
clearest guarantees of human rights in the American constitutional
tradition, the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Sexual preference is
and should be constitutionally suspect because state action on this ground
reflects sectarian intolerance of claims to ethical, political, and
constitutional identity central to the right to conscience. In effect, the
problem with initiatives like Colorado Amendment Two is in that they
unconstitutionally burden such claims of conscience and encourage
conversion to sectarian moral orthodoxy. It is the unjust sectarian
degradation of the identity of lesbian and gay persons that is central to the
suspectness of sexual preference, thus linking the suspectness of sexual
preference to the comparable reasons-the unjust degradation of African-
American and gender identity-for the suspectness of race and gender. In
all these cases, the constitutional evil of the underlying prejudice is its
systematic degradation of identifications central to free moral personality,
including powers to protest injustice in the name and voice of one's human
rights. The suspectness of sexual preference should not, for this reason, be
considered marginal or peripheral to a responsible interpretation of the
American constitutional tradition, but should be a central conservative case
207 See Linde, supra note 4, at 41-42.
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of the enduring meaning in contemporary circumstances of American
constitutional values of human rights and toleration.
The objection to anti-lesbian/gay initiatives, on grounds of their
violation of free speech, is strengthened when reinterpreted as an aspect of
the constitutionally guaranteed right of conscience. Censorship of speech is
certainly one aspect of the constitutional issue. However, the deeper
constitutional insult of such initiatives is their expression through public
law of sectarian religious discrimination against legitimate forms of
conscience that, on grounds of principle, have as much of a claim to equal
protection as any other form of conscience. The emphasis of the free
speech argument on lesbian and gay identity may, in light of the alternative
perspective proposed here, reasonably be interpreted to mean to make this
point exactly.
Finally, the political participation objection to these initiatives,
however dubious as a general argument of either constitutional or political
theory, may reasonably be understood to make a narrower point about the
unconstitutional entrenchment of rights-denying forms of prejudice. Hunter
v. Erickson,208 on my interpretation, makes this point exactly: issues of
discrimination on grounds of race, religion, and ancestry may not be
removed selectively from the political process. Colorado Amendment Two
violates this principle a fortiori: it selectively removes from the ordinary
political process not all grounds for discrimination on grounds of
conscience, but discrimination on the basis of one specific form of
conscience, namely, discrimination on grounds of lesbian and gay identity.
The state may be no more complicitous with the construction of the rights-
denying dehumanization of lesbians and gays than it may be with that of
Jews, African-Americans, or women.
One might be struck by the paradox that these arguments, invariably
clarified or strengthened by the alternative perspective here proposed,
make no reference to it when, on examination, their legitimacy expressly
or implicitly assumes this perspective. The paradox is all the more puzzling
because these arguments much more closely capture and express the reality
of the situation: the emancipation of self-respecting lesbian and gay
conscience voicing its claims to basic justice and the aggressively
reactionary religious war on these claims to respecting such a form of
conscience, let alone its claims to justice. Lesbians and gay men should, on
this reactionary view, return supinely to the closet of their cultural
invisibility and silence, surrendering their minds and hearts to the measure
of the dehumanized stereotype that has historically shrunk and degraded
them.
208 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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But, proponents of basically sound constitutional arguments are
understandably as much under the sway of dominant, uncritical
majoritarian assumptions as their opponents. Advocates of the rights of
lesbian and gay persons may assume uncritically that their understanding of
these rights has been and is so opposed to and by dominant religious
understandings that these rights cannot, in their nature, be protected by
guarantees that include protections of religious conscience. Such
assumptions rest on a startling non sequitur: if arguments of one's
opponents depend on (even admittedly bad or sectarian) religion or
conscience, one's own arguments cannot depend on anything remotely of
that sort, as if sectarian conscience must be the measure of all arguments of
conscience (including, paradoxically, one's own). But, such erroneous
assumptions not only underestimate the capacity of traditionally religious
people to rethink and recast their own traditions on grounds of justice, but
also fail to take seriously what is fundamental to all serious advocacy for
the basic rights of lesbian and gay persons, namely, that the grounds for
claims to lesbian and gay identity are rooted in the most basic rights owed
all persons under American constitutionalism. We no more can permit
sectarians to define for us the meaning of constitutional values like
conscience and toleration than we can permit them to define the meaning of
our lives and struggles as free people.
The emphasis placed in this Article on the right to conscience may
have been resisted for another, more weighty reason. Most serious
discussion of the suspectness of sexual preference has, as we have seen,
assumed that sexual preference must, to qualify as a suspect classification,
be pressed into the Procrustean model of immutability, salience, and
powerlessness already discussed at length. If this model were the only
available approach to qualifying sexual preference as a suspect
classification, arguments based on the right to conscience reasonably might
be correspondingly de-emphasized because these arguments place weight
on choice and identification in ways that are in tension with immutability
and the like. But, as already argued, the emphasis on immutability,
salience, and powerlessness is an interpretive mistake both as a matter of
the constitutional principle of suspect classification analysis in general and
the suspectness of sexual preference in particular. All compelling
arguments for suspect classification status turn on the irrationalist burdens
placed on identifications central to moral personality. Sexual preference is
suspect forthrightly because irrationalist burdens today are placed precisely
19941
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on the identifications central to the moral personality of lesbian and gay
persons, as the analysis of Colorado Amendment Two makes quite clear.
We have nothing to lose by abandoning the argument from immutability,
salience, and powerlessness, which has certainly achieved little in any
event. We need a new approach, one closer to our experience and closer to
the reality of our struggle.
The appeal of such an approach is its truth-its truth as a matter of
constitutional interpretation, but, equally importantly, its self-respecting
truth to ourselves. The shape we give to constitutional arguments is not
merely or only or perhaps even primarily whether they will be accepted by
a court now, for courts have disappointed us just as presidents have
betrayed us and Congress has abused us. The shape we give to
constitutional arguments constructs the shape of our moral identity as
lesbian and gay persons, and we must responsibly define ourselves in the
way most adequate to the common grievances of our diverse lives and
experiences. 2°9 The appeal to the right to conscience is, in my judgment,
compelling because it most responsibly articulates our common grievances,
and thus our demands for self-respect which will not acquiesce again in the
silence of the grave assigned us by the dominant religio-cultural orthodoxy
that we challenge and must challenge.
If the above reasoning is correct, no argument currently made on
behalf of the unconstitutionality of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives need be
abandoned. The point is that each of them is strengthened when brought
into proper relationship to the argument that has been offered here. We
need to make and pursue all these arguments, including arguments not only
of high constitutional principle but also of technical procedural detail that,
properly interpreted, enable us better to resist the blatant political
irrationalism to which these initiatives unconstitutionally pander. Much of
American federal and state constitutional law, both procedural and
substantive, is understood most plausibly as a way of channeling the
political irrationalism the founders called faction, including prominently
religious factions, through constitutional demands and structures of public
reason that would detoxify its moral poisons. 210 Accordingly, the sense of
the range of substantive and procedural arguments deployed against anti-
lesbian/gay initiatives is, in my judgment, clarified by the kind of argument
proposed here, focusing, as it does, on the reasonable requirements of
constitutional civility that all Americans have the right to demand as the
209 On the need for lesbian and gay scholars to frame their arguments in ways
that reflect a reasonable consensus among them, see Halley, supra note 62.
210 For elaboration of this theme as pervasive in the American founding, see
RIcHARDs, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 17, at 32-39.
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condition for politically legitimate government. Correspondingly, we have
the right to resist, in whatever ways are available to us, the distortions of
these requirements on which proponents of anti-lesbian/gay initiatives
invariably depend. The weight we assign to these arguments is best
interpreted in light of the argument offered and defended here. In light of
this argument, we better understand our arguments as citizens and lawyers
as we better define ourselves as persons. Perhaps, in light of this
argument, we also will be better understood and even vindicated as
members of equal standing of the American constitutional community. That
may be our not unreasonable constitutional faith in the integrity of our
fellow Americans in a matter as constitutionally essential as the basic
human right to conscience.
V. CONCLUSION
Lesbian and gay persons demand personal and moral identity on
grounds of justice resting on the inalienable right of conscience that is the
right of every American. They have the right to demand on that ground
that their difference from the heterosexual majority is no longer a ground
for the expression through public law of the constitutionally condemned
irrationalism of sectarian identity politics. Identity and difference must be
reconstructed on grounds of justice. This has been the struggle for
constitutional decency and integrity of African-Americans and women
under constitutional law, and it is the same struggle, on grounds of
principle, of lesbians and gays. 21'
Lesbian and gay persons must reclaim their constitutional tradition
from the sectarian bigots who make their narrow minds and cramped souls
the measure of human and constitutional rights and responsibilities. By
remaking American constitutionalism in their own image, lesbians and gays
will, like Martin Luther King's comparable demands,212 confirm the moral
power of outcasts to lead the nation into a deeper understanding of the
meaning of a community not of race or gender or sexual preference, but a
moral community of human rights. That is a morally constructive task
which touches with ethically prophetic fire not only the lives and struggles
of lesbian and gay persons, but also the meaning of life for all Americans.
Thus, life is lived not in the vacancies of consumerist distractions or the
211 For exploration of similar themes, see WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY,
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX 64-94,
158-97 (1991).
212 For a further discussion of the role African-Americans played in constitutional
development, see RiCHARDS, CONSCIENCE, supra note 26, at 257-58.
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insipidities of mobility without aim, but in distinguished service of the
better interpretation of one of the world's most humane constitutional
traditions in light of its normative promise and demand of respect for
universal human rights under law. One thus dignifies one's life as a lesbian
or gay person and as an American. Few lives could be better lived than in
such service.
Claims of lesbian and gay identity rest on the most fundamental
principles of human rights in our tradition, in particular, the right to
conscience, a right central to any sound understanding and conservation of
the enduring values of American constitutionalism. Their claims are, in
their nature, claims of conscience, of ethical emancipation and
empowerment resting on conscientious convictions about how a life is well
and responsibly lived. Their opponents aggressively condemn them,
essentially in terms of heresy and blasphemy from what, in their view,
alone can be the measure of religious truth. A constitutional tradition that
knows neither heresy nor blasphemy as constitutionally acceptable forms of
law must condemn attempts, like Colorado Amendment Two, to use law to
degrade lesbian and gay identity as heresy and blasphemy against true
value in living.
The struggle for lesbian and gay identity, on terms of justice, is our
contemporary retelling of the oldest narrative of civil liberty, the struggle
for the inalienable right of conscience against the manifold forms of
subjugation of the moral power to understand, let alone to claim, the rights
of one's human nature as a free and responsible person and ethical agent.
To fulfill our responsibilities in this struggle, we must understand the
stakes, in particular, the central role of the struggle of lesbian and gay
identity in both a reasonable and conservative public understanding, in
contemporary circumstances, of the struggle against intolerance and the
demand that constitutional institutions refuse complicity, on grounds of
principle, with its dehumanizing evils.
Colorado Amendment Two and its imitations are unconstitutional
because they enlist the state in active complicity with the evil of denying
persons the most basic right of their moral personalities-the right to forge
conscientiously a mind and heart that demands justice. To crush the human
spirit in this way prepares a nation, as twentieth century experience shows
so clearly, to accept injustice and to rationalize atrocity. Americans have
the responsibilities that go with the good fortune of living under a
constitutional order that, properly interpreted, refuses complicity with such
a denial of the most basic human rights. We must make clear that what is
[V/ol. 55:491
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at stake is nothing less than the interpretive integrity and conservation of
our most basic constitutional principles, which are not suspended when a
minority is irrationally despised and degraded. Indeed, the test of our
constitutional principles is to stand by them when they are needed, rather
than when they are not. We must stand on these principles, and dignify
ourselves and our nation by the integrity of our demands for no more, but
certainly no less, than respect for the right of conscience due all
Americans.

